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INFORMATION AND THE MARKET FOR UNION REPRESENTATION
Matthew T. Bodie∗
In its oversight of union representation elections, the National Labor Relations
Board seeks to create “laboratory conditions” to determine “the uninhibited
desires” of employees. Despite its comprehensive regulation of union and
employer campaign conduct, the Board fails to insure that employees get basic
information relating to their decision. This Article proposes a new paradigm
for the representation decision: that of a purchase of representation services.
This “purchase of services” model demonstrates that the market for union
representation lacks the standard features required under economic theory to
drive information into the marketplace. The resulting information deficiencies
may render employees poorly equipped to make their representation decision.

INTRODUCTION
In 2006 unions represented roughly 8.7 million private-sector employees.1
Although a substantial number, the percentage of private-sector employees who
are represented by unions has been steadily and seemingly inexorably falling.2
The pressure of continued losses has driven union leaders to make organizing –
namely, the recruiting of new members – their top priority. In 1995, the AFLCIO elected John Sweeney on a platform of increased outreach and renewed
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1
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, News Release, Union Membership in 2006,
Table 3, January 25, 2007, available at: http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t03.htm
[hereinafter 2007 BLS News Release].
2
At their peak in the 1950s, unions represented more than a third of the workforce . MICHAEL
GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (1987); LEO TROY &
NEIL SHEFLIN, UNION SOURCEBOOK: MEMBERSHIP, STRUCTURE & FINANCE DIRECTORY app. A at
A-1 (1985). By 1983, only a fifth of the workforce was unionized; now, only twelve percent are
union members. 2007 BLS News Release, supra note 1.
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organizing efforts.3 His tenure has been marked by a greater devotion to
organizing efforts.4 Despite these efforts, union membership continued to
decline. By 2005, there was sufficient disenchantment with Sweeney’s efforts
that several of the biggest unions in America, including the Service Employees
International Union (SEIU) and the Teamsters, left the AFL-CIO and formed a
new coalition specifically focused on organizing efforts.5
In many ways, union organizing difficulties resemble the problems faced
generally by businesses in service industries. Organizing entails union agents
working to bring a group of employees under the union’s representational aegis.
In essence, they are attempting to sell employees on the benefits that union
representation will bring. Unlike other services, however, union representation
must be chosen collectively by employees as a unit.
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) provides the legal framework
for private-sector employees to choose whether to have this collective
representation. Under the NLRA, a majority vote determines whether the
employees will or will not have a labor organization6 as their representative at
the bargaining table.7 Although the vote is a collective process, each employee
must make an individual choice – through a secret ballot – as to whether she
wants such representation. The National Labor Relations Board has famously
likened the representation election process to “a laboratory in which an
experiment may be conducted, under conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to
determine the uninhibited desires of the employees.”8
The Board has spent nearly sixty years refining the conditions of this
laboratory. Countless Board decisions have parsed what an employer may
predict about the effects of unionization; what the employer may promise to its
employees during the pre-election “campaign” period; what unions may
promise to prospective members; and what effects a misrepresentation will
have on the parties. What is notable for its absence, however, is the lack of any
requirements that certain information be disclosed to employees. Instead, the
Board’s primary concern has been curtailing certain types of information that it
deems to have a coercive or otherwise adulterating influence. The Board
implicitly assumes that the campaign between the union (in favor of its election
3

Marion Crain & Ken Matheney, Labor’s Identity Crisis, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1767, 1784-85 (2001).
Id. at 1785 (“Since Sweeney's ascendance to the presidency . . . , the AFL-CIO has made
significant progress in revitalizing itself through a renewed commitment to organizing.”).
5
George Raine, Dissident Unions Put the Focus on Organizing, S.F. CHRON., July 31, 2005, at
E1.
6
The Act defines a "labor organization" as "any organization of any kind . . . in which employee
participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers
concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of
work." 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (2000).
7
Id. § 159.
8
General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948).
4
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petition) and the employer (presumably opposed to the election petition) will
generate sufficient information for the employees to make an informed and
rational decision.
This article challenges that assumption. In evaluating the regulation of the
representation campaign, both the Board and the majority of commentators
have based that their analyses of representation elections on the model of a
laboratory or, in quite a contrast, a political campaign.9 Instead of seeing the
representation election as the end result of a political campaign, or a scientific
experiment conducted in the lab, the election should be treated as a collective
economic decision about whether to engage in a certain kind of activity. It is,
in fact, a choice to “purchase” union representation services. Viewed in this
manner, it becomes clear that the actors in the “market” – namely, unions and
employers – may not always provide the information necessary for employees
to make rational decisions about union representation.
In Part I, the article considers the current regulatory framework for
representation elections. It discusses the two paradigms that have influenced
election regulation: the scientific laboratory and the political election. It then
explores important academic commentary that has suggested new approaches to
this framework. Part II describes why the choice for union representation
should be viewed as an economic decision, rather than a collective political
decision or a scientific experiment. Part III discusses reasons to suspect that
employees are not getting the information they need to make rational economic
decisions about union representation. Part IV concludes with initial thoughts
on addressing the information problems in the market for union representation.

PART I: REGULATING THE REPRESENTATION ELECTION
Under the system established by the NLRA, the representation process
begins with a petition – filed by employees, a labor organization, or an
employer – avowing that a group of employees wish to be represented by a
particular labor organization. The petition proposes a particular “bargaining
unit” of employees – namely, a group of employees that are deemed to share

9

See, e.g., Derek C. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections under
the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 38, 68 (1964) (“[R]epresentation elections
are closely akin to political contests.”); Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union
Representation Elections and Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495, 497 (1993) (noting that
“election rules bear the stamp of an analogy between political representation and labor
representation”).
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collective interests in the terms and conditions of employment.10 The petition is
generally accompanied by evidence that employees support an election to
determine the labor organization’s status. At least thirty percent of the
employees in the proposed bargaining unit must support an election before the
Board will process the petition further.11 Pre-election hearings will be held if
the employer or employees wish to challenge the appropriateness of the
bargaining unit proposed by the petition.12
If the Board determines that the unit is appropriate, it will move ahead with
a secret ballot election.13 If a majority of the employees casting ballots vote in
favor of representation, the labor organization is certified as the collective
bargaining representative for all of the employees in the unit.14 Although
dissenting employees are not forced to join the union, they may be forced to
pay a pro rata share of the collective representation costs incurred on their
behalf.15 Employers or unions can challenge the results of the election based on
the eligibility of certain voters or conduct that improperly influenced the
election.16 The Board then conducts an investigation, which may include a
hearing for the collection of evidence.17 The Director then either certifies the
election results or voids the results and orders a new election. These orders can
be appealed to the five-member Board and then to a United States Circuit Court
of Appeals.

10

See Uyeda v. Brooks, 365 F.2d 326, 329 (6th Cir. 1966) (citing NLRB v. Ideal Laundry & Dry
Cleaning Co., 330 F.2d 712 (10th Cir. 1964)). A bargaining unit can consist of a small number of
employees with a particular job description, or it can be all of an employer’s employees.
11
See 29 C.F.R. § 101.18(a) (2006).
12
Id. § 101.20(a). At the end of the hearing, the Board’s Regional Director will issue a decision
about the appropriateness of the bargaining unit. Id. § 101.21(a). The parties may ask the Board
to review this decision. Id. § 101.21(d). However, the Board has the final say; the pre-election
ruling is not reviewable prior to the election. If the employer wishes to challenge the
appropriateness of the Board’s ruling after the union has won the election, it must refuse to
negotiate with the union. The subsequent unfair labor practice proceedings then provide an
opportunity for court review. See American Federation of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940)
(holding that Board’s orders in election certification proceedings were not final orders subject to
judicial review); MICHAEL C. HARPER ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS
299-300 (5th ed. 2003) (discussing the process for employer judicial review).
13
Id. § 101.21.
14
See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2000).
15
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2000) (permitting employers to require union membership as a
condition of employment); NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 744-45 (1963)
(permitting “agency shop” agreements whereby unions charge non-members for the costs of
collective representation).
16
29 C.F.R. § 102.69(a) (2006).
17
Id.§ 102.69(c), (e).
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The NLRA itself does not provide many specifics on regulating the election
process. The 1935 Wagner Act18 only provided that the Board designate a
representative selected by a majority of the unit employees.19 Initially, the
Board deemed evidence of employee sentiment presented at a hearing sufficient
to certify a union as representative.20 However, by 1939 the Board had decided
to require secret ballot elections to determine the will of the majority.21 This
change was codified in the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments, which provide that
if a question of representation exists, the Board “shall direct an election by
secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof.”22 Beyond the need for a
secret ballot, the NLRA says little about the election or the regulation of the
period prior to the election known as the “campaign period.”
Thus, the regulation of the election process was largely left to the Board to
implement. What exactly could be said, and what could not be said? What
would be the ramifications of prohibited conduct? The Board has felt the pull
of two competing concerns in this area: a concern to protect employees from
undue influence, and a concern to let interested parties speak their mind. It was
clear that under § 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, employers could not “interfere with,
restrain, or coerce” employees who were exercising rights protected under § 7
of the Act. If an employer’s campaign activities rose to the level of a § 8(a)(1)
violation, they were undoubtedly prohibited. But what about campaign activity
that might intimidate or coerce employees, but did not violate § 8(a)(1)?
Congress had chosen to carve out a fairly big chunk of such conduct for
protection through § 8(c) of the NLRA. According to § 8(c), “the expression of
any views, argument, or opinion” could not be deemed to an unfair labor
practice “if such expression contain[ed] no threat of reprisal or force or promise
of benefit.”23 However, in General Shoe Corp., the Board established that
conduct protected by § 8(c) could nevertheless be grounds for setting aside an
election. The Board rejected the claim that § 8(c) prohibited the Board from
relying on conduct other than an unfair labor practice to overturn an election.24
Since the text of § 8(c) only spoke to the definition of an unfair labor practice,
the Board did not view it as a limitation on the grounds for overturning an
election. Overturning an election was not akin to an unfair labor practice.

18
The NLRA was created by the Wagner Act and has since been amended, most notably by the
1947 Taft-Hartley Act.
19
See Becker supra note CB1, at 507.
20
Id. (noting that for the Board’s first five years roughly a quarter of all unions were certified as
representative without an election).
21
Cudahy Packing Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 526 (1939).
22
29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (2000).
23
29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2000).
24
General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948).
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Having established a broad range of potential regulation, the Board has
embarked on a circuitous journey of campaign regulation. As noted above,
however, the twin concerns of freedom from coercion and freedom of
expression have marked the Board’s path. Each concern has become manifest
in paradigms used by the Board in making their regulatory policies: the
paradigms of laboratory conditions and political elections. These two
paradigms are considered more specifically below.
A. The Laboratory Conditions Model
In General Shoe Corp., the Board established that "[i]n election
proceedings, it is the Board's duty to provide a laboratory in which an
experiment may be conducted, under conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to
determine the uninhibited desires of employees."25 As noted above, General
Shoe made it clear that unfair labor practices would not be the sole grounds for
overturning an election. The case was not merely about the statutory
application of § 8(c) in the election context, however. It set forth a standard, a
model, even a philosophy, about how to regulate the representation campaign.
The metaphor is one of scientific process: a “laboratory” for an “experiment”
with “conditions as nearly ideal as possible” to determine the “uninhibited
desires” of employees. In deciding whether to invalidate an election, the Board
stated that “our only consideration derives from the Act which calls for freedom
of choice by employees as to a collective bargaining representative.”26
The laboratory conditions model has led to policies designed to prevent
undue influences on employees. Three of these policies – prohibitions against
coercion, promises or grants of benefits, and inflammatory appeals – are
discussed below.
1. Coercion. The Board’s prohibitions against employer coercion in the
election context build on § 8(a)(1) of the Act, which makes it an unfair labor
practice for employers “to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of [their collective bargaining] rights.”27 Any effort to compel the
employee to vote a certain way is deemed not only an infringement on the
laboratory conditions but also a trespass against employees’ protected rights.
Although threats of physical violence are certainly prohibited, the more
common concern is threats of economic coercion by the employer. An
employer may not threaten to fire employees or change their working

25

General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948).
Id. at 126 (quoting P.D. Gwaltney, 74 N.L.R.B. 371 (1947)). This sentiment is probably based
on the Act’s Findings and Policies Section, which states that one of the declared policies of the
Act is to “protect[] the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
27
Id. § 158(a)(1).
26
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conditions if they support the union.28 A threat to close a plant because of
union activity is also prohibited.29
However, the line becomes fuzzier when an employer is trying to convince
employees of the negative consequences of union representation. The employer
is permitted to inform employees about the employer’s views on unionization,
and unionization may in fact lead to certain events that would make it more
likely for the employer to close a plant, perhaps out of economic necessity.
Such information would be important, perhaps critical, to an employee’s
representation decision. But an employer could easily frame threats and other
coercion as campaign “predictions.” Because the employer has the ultimate
control over the fate of the plant, the employer’s prediction looks more like a
threat. Thus, any regulation in this area must balance the free speech rights of
the employer with the rights of employees to be free from economic coercion.
The Supreme Court broadly demarcated the boundaries of threat and
prediction in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.30 The Court held that “an employer
is free to communicate to his employees any of his general views about
unionism or any of his specific views about a particular union, so long as the
communications do not contain a threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit.”31 An employer may even make a prediction about the impact
unionization would have on the company. However, such a prediction “must
be carefully phrased on the basis of objective fact to convey an employer’s
belief as to demonstrably probable consequences beyond his control or to
convey a management decision already arrived at to close the plant in case of
unionization.”32 Any hint that the “prediction” is instead a statement about
what an employer might do solely on its own initiative would render such a
prediction impermissible.
In practice, the difference between permissible predictions and unlawful
threats has often rested on “fine distinctions.”33 Generally, an employer is
allowed to make purely objective statements about what has happened in other
unionized companies or what the employer’s customers have stated with regard
to the effects of unionization.34 However, any interpretation of such “facts” that
casts unionization in a negative light is apt to turn the prediction into coercion.
The Board and the U.S. Circuit Courts have often differed on where this line is
28
See E.W. Grobbel Sons, 322 N.L.R.B. 304 (1996) (holding that a discontinuance of benefits
was an unlawful reprisal).
29
However, the employer may in fact shut down the plant after the election. Textile Workers v.
Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 274 n.20 (1965).
30
395 U.S. 575 (1969).
31
Id. at 618.
32
Id.
33
PATRICK HARDIN & JOHN E. HIGGINS, JR., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 131 (4th ed. 2001).
34
Id. at 130-31.
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to be drawn. For example, in DTR Industries, the Board found that an
employer violated § 8(a)(1) through its pre-election letter which stated “our
business would automatically be reduced if the union wins the election.”35
However, the Sixth Circuit refused enforcement, finding the letter to be a
permissible prediction based on objective fact.36
The Board has also found predictions about the futility of union organizing
are generally impermissible threats. The Board reads such predictions as
threats to engage in bad-faith bargaining and therefore threats to engage in
illegal activity.37 However, employers are permitted to describe their own
rights and remedies under the NLRA, even if such descriptions paint a gloomy
picture of unionization. For example, in what might be characterized as the
“bargaining from scratch” argument, employers may tell employees that they
are not required to agree to anything when bargaining with the union, and that
they have as much a right to ask for wage and benefit reductions as the union
has to ask for increases.38 However, an employer may not use this assessment
as a threat to bargain in bad faith or a threat to reduce benefits illegally prior to
bargaining.39 Similarly, an employer may offer an opinion about the possibility
of union-called strikes, and may note that it has the right to permanently replace
employees who go out on strike. Predictions of violence are also prohibited if
depicted as the inevitable consequence of unionization. However, the Board
has upheld an employer’s right to state during a campaign that the union might
send someone out to break employees’ legs in order to collect dues.40
Ultimately, there is no clear line between impermissible threats and
permissible campaign rhetoric. The Board has emphasized the need to look at
the totality of the circumstances in figuring out where employer campaign
conduct falls. If the overall campaign has had a tendency to threaten employees
with possible violations of their collective rights, then the Board will find a §
8(a)(1) violation and overturn the election. However, such determinations,
based as they are on a multi-factor contextual test, will be subject to
indeterminacy and uncertainty. As such, they threaten either to under-deter
coercive threats or over-deter the provision of information that may be material
to the employees’ decision.
2. Promises and Grants of Benefits. In keeping with its efforts to protect
the “uninhibited desires” of employees, the NLRA also prohibits bribery. The
35

DTR Industries, Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 833 (1993), enforcement denied, 39 F.3d 106 (6th Cir.
1994).
36
DTR Industries , Inc., v. NLRB, 39 F.3d 106, 115 (6th Cir. 1994).
37
See, e.g., American Greetings Corp., 146 N.L.R.B. 1440, 1445 n.4 (1964).
38
See Fern Terrace Lodge of Bowling Green, 297 N.L.R.B. 8 (1989).
39
See, e.g., Golden Eagle Spotting Co., 319 N.L.R.B. 64 (1995); Advo Systems, 297 N.L.R.B.
926 (1990).
40
Sears Roebuck & Co., 305 N.L.R.B. 193 (1991).
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employer may not promise to better employees’ terms and conditions in
exchange for support of or opposition to the union. In a famous passage, the
Supreme Court described the rationale for the prohibition this way:
The danger inherent in well-timed increases in benefits is the
suggestion of a fist inside the velvet glove. Employees are not
likely to miss the inference that the source of benefits now
conferred is also the source from which future benefits must
flow and which may dry up if not obliged.41
The Board and the courts have interpreted § 8(a)(1) to prohibit
suspiciously-timed benefits even when no strings are explicitly attached. In
order to provide its employees with improved terms of employment during the
course of the representation campaign, the employer must show that its actions
were motivated by factors other than the campaign.42 Clear evidence that the
employer had been planning such an improvement before notice of the
campaign will allow the employer to proceed. But if the benefit is
discretionary, and the employer’s decision not dictated by its previous behavior,
the Board may very well find an implicit attempt to interfere with the
campaign. So too may efforts by an employer to solicit or remedy employee
grievances be deemed impermissible interference.43 The Board has determined
that suggestion boxes and employee hotlines may amount to an implied
promise to remedy employee grievances and thereby would be impermissible
under § 8(a)(1).44 However, it should also be noted that any efforts to scale
back on benefits that would have otherwise been granted (absent the campaign)
would also be a § 8(a)(1) violation. Thus, employers must tread carefully in
this area: they may be liable for both decisions to grant benefits and decisions
not to grant benefits, depending on the circumstances.
Union promises about securing certain terms and conditions have been held
to be permissible, since employees, in the Board’s view, recognize that such
promises are “dependent on contingencies beyond the Union’s control.”45
However, unions are not permitted to offer tangible, valuable benefits to
employees in the context of a representation campaign. Elections have been
invalidated after union gifts of life insurance coverage,46 jackets,47 hats and
41

NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405 (1964).
American Sunroof Corp., 248 N.L.R.B. 748 (1980), enforced in part, 667 F.2d 20 (6th Cir.
1981).
43
See, e.g., Bell Halter, Inc., 276 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1985).
44
See Torbitt & Castleman, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 907 (1996).
45
Smith Co., 192 N.L.R.B. 1098, 1101 (1971).
46
Wagner Elec. Corp., 167 N.L.R.B. 532 (1967).
47
Owens-Illinois, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 1235 (1984).
42
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shirts,48 and alcoholic drinks.49
Here, too, however, there has been
indeterminacy. One court ruled that a union’s promise to hold “the biggest
party in the history of Texas” if it won was an impermissible inducement,50
while another held that a promise of a victory dinner dance was not
objectionable.51 The Board and the courts have also wrestled over the
permissibility of union lawsuits against employers on behalf of employees in
the midst of a representation campaign.52
Union offers to waive employee initiation fees have received sustained
scrutiny from the Board and the courts. The basic principle was established in
NLRB v. Savair Manufacturing Co.,53 which held that unions cannot offer to
waive initiation fees for employees who sign authorization cards before an
election.54 The Court held that such a practice would allow the union to “buy
endorsements and paint a false portrait of employee support during its election
campaign.”55 However, the Court’s ruling did allow for the waiver of initiation
fees more generally: specifically, the waiver had to be open “not only to those
who have signed up with the union before an election but also those who join
after the election.”56 As a result, the Board and circuit courts have been left to
parse exactly what a union may say in conveying the waiver during the
campaign. The Board and the Seventh Circuit found the union’s waiver
unobjectionable when it stated that it “usually does not charge an Initiation
Fee” until some time after the election, despite the “usually.”57 However, when
a union offered to waive fees only to “charter members” without explaining the
term,58 or said that fees would be waived for “anyone joining now, during this
campaign,”59 such promises were held to violate laboratory principles. The
Board permits unions to clarify or correct objectionable waiver offers but holds
them to a fairly high standard of clarity.60
48

NLRB v. Shrader’s, Inc., 928 F.2d 194 (6th Cir. 1991).
Revco D.S. v. NLRB, 830 F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1987).
50
Trencor, Inc. v. NLRB, 110 F.3d 268, 272 (5th Cir. 1997).
51
NLRB v. L & J Equipment Co., 745 F.2d 224 (3d Cir. 1984).
52
See, e.g., Nestle Ice Cream v. NLRB, 46 F.3d 578, 584 (6th Cir. 1995) (concluding that union
lawsuit on behalf of employees for overtime pay was an impermissible bribe).
53
414 U.S. 270 (1973).
54
Id. at 277.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 272 n.4.
57
Certain-Teed Products Corp. v. NLRB, 562 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1977), enforcing 225 N.L.R.B.
971 (1976).
58
Inland Shoe Mfg. Co., 211 N.L.R.B. 724 (1974).
59
Crane Co., 225 N.L.R.B. 657 (1976).
60
See, e.g., Claxton Mfg. Co., 258 N.L.R.B. 417 (1981) (holding that letter promising no
initiation fees “as of this day” was too ambiguous to clarify earlier impermissible waiver offer).
An interesting twist on the Savair line of cases involves one union’s requirement that a majority
of employees prepay a reduced initiation fee and one month’s dues in order for the union to file
49
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3. Inflammatory appeals. As part of the laboratory conditions doctrine, the
Board prohibits appeals to racial prejudice or pride that it deems too
“inflammatory” for the campaign. The seminal case in this area is Sewell
Manufacturing Co.,61 in which the employer appealed to racial prejudice in its
anti-union campaign efforts. The employer linked the union to unrelated
desegregation efforts and used a picture of a white union official dancing with a
black woman in its campaign literature.62 The Board found such conduct to be
grounds for a new election. According to the Board, racial appeals were only
permissible if they were truthful, germane to the election, and not overly
inflammatory.63
The Sewell standard has resulted in a hodge-podge of rulings that, as in
other areas, lack the clarity and coherence necessary for uniform application.
The Board has generally applied a more lenient standard to appeals of racial
pride and solidarity; indeed, such appeals may be a legitimate part of an effort
to improve terms of pay and working conditions.64 However, the U.S. Courts
of Appeal have been less forgiving and have clashed with the Board about such
campaign tactics.65 The Board has also generally held that appeals to racial
prejudice have to be “sustained” in order to meet the prohibited threshold,
causing further disagreement. Here too circuit courts have been more willing to
overturn elections based on racist remarks despite the Board’s willingness to
tolerate limited instantiations of such behavior.66 The vague standards,
an election petition. Aladdin Hotel Corp., 229 N.L.R.B. 499 (1977). If the union lost the
election, the prepaid amounts were forfeit to the union in order to pay for the costs of the
campaign. If the union won the election, it opened up the reduced initiation fees to all employees
for a period of time after the election. The Board, in a 3-2 decision, upheld the policy, finding
that it offered the reduced initiation fee before and after the election. Id. at 500. In dissent, two
members argued that the lock-in and forfeiture provisions would interfere with employees
freedom of choice. Id. at 501-02 (Members Penello and Walther, dissenting). The Ninth Circuit
declined to enforce the Board’s order after finding the union’s letter to be ambiguous as to the
timing of the waiver offer. NLRB v. Aladdin Hotel Corp., 584 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1978).
61
138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962).
62
Id. at 67.
63
Id. at 71-72.
64
See, e.g., Baltimore Luggage Co., 162 N.L.R.B. 1230, 1233-34 (1967) (noting that appeals to
racial unity may be “directed at undoing disadvantages historically imposed” and may be a way
to “unify groups of employees by focusing group attention on common problems”).
65
See, e.g., NLRB v. Schapiro & Whitehouse, 356 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1966) (refusing to enforce
bargaining order because of appeals to racial pride); KI (USA) Corp. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 256, 260
(6th Cir. 1994) (denying enforcement of a bargaining order based on the union’s use of a letter by
a Japanese businessman which allegedly inflamed racial tensions); Case Farms v. NLRB, 128
F.3d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1991) (Willams, J., concurring in judgment) (expressing “concern with
the Board's apparent disregard for the decisions of the Circuit Courts” in matters of concerning
inflammatory racial appeals).
66
See, e.g., M&M Supermarkets v. NLRB, 818 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1987); NLRB v. Eurodrive,
724 F.2d 556 (6th Cir. 1984); NLRB v. Triplex Mfg. Co., 701 F.2d 703 (7th Cir. 1983). Cf.
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combined with the concern that legitimate speech may be prohibited, have led
to calls for reform of this doctrine.67
B. The Political Election Model
In resolving representation campaign questions, the Board uses the
laboratory conditions model as its express paradigm.68 However, courts and
commentators have pointed to another paradigm that also influences the
Board’s approach: that of a political campaign. This is no accident. Supporters
of the Wagner Act, including Senator Wagner himself, used the metaphor of
“workplace democracy” in their rhetoric.69 Linking unionization to such
American ideals as democracy, representation, and freedom of choice served to
rebut concerns that the Wagner Act violated free-market principles and was
therefore anti-American.70 As a result, the notion of political democracy, not a
clinical laboratory, served as the foundation for the Act. The Act itself
highlights this in its preamble, which describes the Act as “protecting the
exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing.”71
The rhetorical emphasis on workplace democracy carried over into the
procedural specifics. Just as representatives are elected through secret ballot
elections, so would workers select their representatives. The NLRA initially
provided that employees would choose their representatives through secret
ballot elections or “any other suitable method to ascertain [sic] such
Clearwater Transport, Inc. v. NLRB, 133 F.3d 1004, 1010 (7th Cir. 1998) (voicing a “strong
objection” to the NLRB’s “seemingly casual reading” of past precedent in such cases).
67
See, e.g., Shepard Tissue, Inc., 326 NLRB 369, 369-73 (1998) (Gould, Chairman, concurring)
(arguing for a new approach to the Sewell doctrine).
68
The “FLB-NLRB” database on Westlaw, which includes NLRB administrative law judge
decisions from 1990, Board decisions from 1935, and related federal court decisions, finds 852
decisions using the term “laboratory conditions.”
69
For example, Senator Wagner stated during Congressional hearings, “That is just the very
purpose of this legislation, to provide industrial democracy.” National Labor Relations Board:
Hearings on S. 1958 Before the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
642 (1935) [hereinafter 1935 NLRA Senate Hearings] (statement of Harvey J. Kelly, American
Newspaper Publishers Association), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 1617, 2028. See also 79 CONG. REC. 9691 (1935)
(statement of Rep. Withrow), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, supra, at 3132 (noting that “self-government through fairly chosen
representatives” was an "inherent" American right); Senator Robert F. Wagner, Address Before
the National Democratic Forum (May 8, 1937), quoted in Leon H. Keyserling, Why the Wagner
Act?, in THE WAGNER ACT: AFTER TEN YEARS 5, 13 (Louis G. Silverberg ed., 1945) (“[T]here
can be no more democratic self-government in industry without workers participating therein,
than there could be democratic government in politics without workers having the right to
vote.”).
70
Becker, supra note CB1, at 496.
71
29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
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representatives.”72 Even though the Wagner Act did not originally provide for
the secret ballot election as the sole means of establishing an employee
representative, Wagner assumed such elections in defending the Act during the
hearings.73 The Taft-Hartley Act eventually codified the secret ballot as the
sole means of selection.74
Courts and commentators have latched on to the political campaign as the
salient analog to the union election campaign. In its review of election
procedures and employer speech, the Supreme Court has characterized the
employee’s choice as the equivalent of a political election.75 Moreover,
numerous commentators have either made the comparison directly76 or noted
the comparison made by others.77 The undercurrent of this analogy is most
likely responsible for some of the contradictions and anomalies we see in Board
regulation of the election campaign. Below I discuss three examples of policies
that seem to derive their justification from the political election analogy: the
employer as “candidate,” misrepresentations, and information regulation and
disclosure.
1. Employer as Candidate. In a political election, two or more candidates
compete against each other to win a particular position. If only one candidate is
running, the election is uncontested. The union election thus runs into a
particularly thorny problem if it is to be analogized to a political election: there
is generally only one union seeking to represent the employees.
This dissonance has been resolved by treating the employer as a party to
and, in some ways, as a competing candidate to the union in the election. The
72

Original NLRA § 9(c), 49 Stat. at 453.
1935 NLRA Senate Hearings, supra note NLRAH, at 642 (statement of Harvey J. Kelly,
American Newspaper Publishers Association), reprinted in 2 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note NLRAH, at 1617, 2028 (“[A]s to ... representation of the workers you cannot have any
more genuine democracy than this. We say under Government supervision let the workers
themselves ... go into a booth and secretly vote, as they do for their political representatives in a
secret ballot, to select their choice.” (Senator Wagner speaking)).
74
29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (2000).
75
See, e.g., NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 331 (1946) (comparing the process for
challenging ineligible voters under Board rules to the process used in political elections); Thomas
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 546 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The necessity for choosing
collective bargaining representatives brings the same nature of problem to groups of organizing
workmen that our representative democratic processes bring to the nation.”).
76
See, e.g., Bok, supra note DB1, at 68 (“[R]epresentation elections are closely akin to political
contests.”); Shawn J. Larsen-Bright, Note, Free Speech and the NLRB’s Laboratory Conditions
Doctrine, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 204, 206 n.11 (2002) (“In this way, representation elections mirror
political elections.”).
77
Becker, supra note CB1, at 497 (noting that “election rules bear the stamp of an analogy
between political representation and labor representation”); Alan Story, Employer Speech, Union
Representation Elections, and the First Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 356, 415
(1995) (noting that representation elections have been “reconceptualized as analogous to political
elections”).
73
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Board has always treated employers as parties to an election: they can file
representation petitions, file objections to bargaining unit, the eligibility of
voters, and the conduct of the campaign. Employers are permitted, along with
union representatives, to place an observer at the polls to monitor the election.78
In addition, the Board has permitted the employer to campaign vigorously
against the union in the manner akin to a candidate. After passage of the
Wagner Act, the Board initially prohibited employers from campaigning
against the union.79 As the Board noted, “An election is not a contest between a
labor organization and the employer of the employees being polled, and
participation by an employer in a preelection campaign as if he were a
contestant is an interference with the employees’ rights . . . .”80 However, as
one commentator has noted, “the creation of an electoral contest in which one
party could campaign while the other had to remain silent contradicted
traditional notions of political freedom.”81 The employer’s ability to campaign
was characterized as a First Amendment issue – the right of the employer to
free speech. In 1945, the Supreme Court sustained the union’s rights of speech
against state interference and then went on to establish that both unions and
employers had parallel rights of speech.82 The Taft-Hartley Act codified this
notion of an employer’s free-speech rights in § 8(c) of the Act.83
The notion of the employer as the competing candidate against the union
has become ingrained in our view of the representation campaign. It has been
used to support the notion of greater employer involvement in the campaign,
and greater freedom by the employer to express its views.84
Other
commentators have attacked the notion that the employer deserves a voice in
the process, pointing to the irrelevance of the employer’s views and the
likelihood of coercion.85 Nevertheless, the role of the employer in the process
78
Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 23 N.L.R.B. 26, 31 n.3a (1940), enforced, 120 F.2d 505 (3d Cir.
1941), enforcement denied on other grounds, 316 U.S. 31 (1942).
79
See, e.g., American Tube Bending Co., 44 N.L.R.B. 121, 133-34 (1942), enforcement denied,
134 F.2d 993 (2d Cir.).
80
Id. at 132.
81
Becker, supra note CB1, at 541.
82
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537-38 (1945).
83
29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2000).
84
Commentators have, for example, argued in favor of retaining the election, as opposed to cardcheck certification, based on the employer’s interest in having its views heard during the
campaign. GETMAN ET AL., supra note JG1, at 136 (“The concept that each party should have a
roughly equal opportunity to persuade the voters is fundamental to the democratic process.”).
See also Larsen-Bright, supra note SLB1, at 242-43 (arguing that the laboratory conditions
doctrine unconstitutionally infringes on an employer’s right to free speech).
85
See Becker, supra note CB1, at 577-601 (arguing the political election analogy is misplaced
and allows employer coercion); Story, supra note AS1, 436-55 (arguing that employer speech is
inherently coercive and should be regulated in the interest of greater employee freedom); Kate E.
Andrias, Note, A Robust Public Debate: Realizing Free Speech in Workplace Representation
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is clearly fixed and seems best explained by the analogy to the political
election.
2. Misrepresentations. The Board’s overall approach to misrepresentations
has been consistent – consistently uninterested. The Board has never wavered
from its position that misrepresentations per se are not prohibited during the
election campaign. As the Board noted, “exaggeration, inaccuracies, halftruths, and name calling, though not condoned, will not be grounds for setting
aside an election.”86 The Board stated: “absolute precision of statement and
complete honesty are not always attainable in an election campaign, nor are
they expected by employees.”87 Thus, unlike the strict rules of truthfulness in
such contexts as the corporate proxy contest,88 the Board has taken a relatively
relaxed approach to misrepresentations throughout its history.
However, the Board has oscillated at the fringes. From 1962 to 1977, the
Board prohibited a subset of misrepresentations that it felt had a particularly
nefarious effect on the representation campaign. The rule, established in
Hollywood Ceramics Co.,89 stated:
[A]n election should be set aside only where there has been a
misrepresentation or other campaign trickery, which involves a
substantial departure from the truth, at a time which prevents the
other party or parties from making an effective reply, so that the
misrepresentation, whether deliberate or not, may reasonably be
expected to have a significant impact on the election.90
Although Hollywood Ceramics did prohibit some forms of misrepresentation,
its scope was rather limited. The election would be upheld if the
misrepresentation concerned an unimportant matter or had no significant
impact or was made at a time that allowed for effective rebuttal or correction.
A misrepresentation would also be insufficient to overturn the election if it was
so exaggerated as to be unbelievable or if employees had sufficient information
already to permit them to evaluate the misrepresentation properly.91
The Board overruled Hollywood Ceramics in its 1977 Shopping Kart
decision.92 Noting that the Hollywood Ceramics rule had been criticized for its
Elections, 112 YALE L.J. 2415, 2453-62 (2003) (arguing for stronger prohibitions on employer
speech to better protect employee freedom of speech).
86
Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221, 226 n.6 (1962).
87
Id. at 223.
88
See SEC Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2006).
89
140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962).
90
Id. at 224.
91
Id.
92
Shopping Kart Food Market, 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977).
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vagueness and indeterminacy, the Board argued that such attention to campaign
propaganda was unnecessary. In fact, it argued that “Board rules in this area
must be based on a view of employees as mature individuals who are capable of
recognizing campaign propaganda for what it is and discounting it.”93 To hold
otherwise would be to countenance “a view of employees as naive and
unworldly whose decision on as critical an issue as union representation is
easily altered by the self-serving campaign claims of the parties.”94 A year
later, the Board reversed course, and a three-member majority in General Knit
of California returned to the Hollywood Ceramics standard.95 Four years later,
however, the hands-off policy of Shopping Kart was yet again reinstated by a
three-member Board majority in Midland National Life Insurance Co.96 After
reviewing the history of the Board’s treatment of misrepresentations,97 the
Midland majority argued in favor of the bright-line, no-policing standard, citing
the “many difficulties attending the Hollywood Ceramics rule,” as well as the
need for “the certainty and finality of election results.”98
The decision in Midland remains the law. Some circuit courts, however,
have been rather grumbling in their acceptance of the Midland standard. In
NLRB v. New Columbus Nursing Home,99 the First Circuit endorsed the Board’s
holding below, but noted that “we do not necessarily endorse application of the
Midland rule to situations involving charges of more fundamental and clear-cut
misrepresentations.”100
Noting that the Board had “a duty to provide
reasonably for the employees’ unhampered freedom of choice,” the court held
that a strict adherence to Midland might, in some cases, constitute legal error.101
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has held that “[t]here may be cases where no
forgery can be proved, but where the misrepresentation is so pervasive and the
deception so artful that employees will be unable to separate truth from untruth
and where their right to a free and fair choice will be affected.”102 The Sixth
93

Id. at 1313.
Id. However, one member of the majority wrote in concurrence that she would set aside an
election if there had been an “egregious mistake of fact.” Id. at 1314 (Murphy, Chair.,
concurring).
95
General Knit of California, 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978).
96
Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982).
97
Id. at 129-30.
98
Id. at 131. The majority did make clear that the Board still would overturn election in
instances “where a party has used forged documents which render the voters unable to recognize
propaganda for what it is.”
99
NLRB v. New Columbus Nursing Home, 720 F.2d 726 (1st Cir. 1983).
100
Id. at 729.
101
Id. (citation and quotations omitted). In concurrence, Judge Bailey Aldrich wrote: “Midland
seems to be burning down the barn to get rid of the rats; an abnegation of the Board's recognized
duty to ensure a fair and free choice of bargaining.”
102
Van Dorn Plastics Machinery Co. v. NLRB, 736 F.2d 343, 348 (6th Cir. 1984).
94
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Circuit continues to apply this standard to misrepresentation cases.103 While
other circuit courts have adopted the Midland standard,104 a number of circuit
courts, including ones in circuits that have adopted it, have not yet decided
whether to “fully support” the standard.105
3. Information Regulation and Disclosure. Despite the finely-grained
regulation of what cannot be said during the representation campaign, the
Board has done little to require information disclosure from the parties. There
are no affirmative disclosure requirements on the part of employers or unions to
provide certain kinds of information to employees. In Florida Mining &
Materials Corp., the Board rejected the employer's efforts to impose an
"affirmative disclosure" requirement on the pre-election process.106 In that
case, the union failed to reveal to the employees that the day before the
election, it had been placed under temporary trusteeship by the international
union. The employer sought to overturn the election based on the union's
failure to disclose. The authority of the Board to impose such a rule was not
questioned; however, the Board refused to do so based on its concerns about the
administrative burden it would cause. The Fifth Circuit found that the Board
had not abused its discretion.107
The only instance of such required disclosure is not information that must
be disclosed to employees, but rather information that the employer must
disclose to the petitioning union. In Excelsior Underwear, Inc.,108 the Board
required employers to provide the union with the names and addresses of
employees in the unit.109 This information is required within seven days of the
approval of an election agreement; the union need not request it.110 The
Excelsior requirement gives the union the ability to send materials and other
103

See NLRB v. St. Francis Healthcare Centre, 212 F.3d 945, 963-66 (6th Cir. May 19, 2000);
NLRB v. Hub Plastics, Inc., 52 F.3d 608, 611-13 (6th Cir. May 08, 1995).
104
C.J. Krehbiel Co. v. NLRB, 844 F.2d 880, 883-84 (D.C. Cir. 1988); State Bank of India v.
NLRB, 808 F.2d 526, 538-39 (7th Cir. 1986); NLRB v. Semco Printing Ctr., Inc., 721 F.2d 886,
892 (2d Cir. 1983); NLRB v. Monark Boat Co., 713 F.2d 355, 360 (8th Cir. 1983); NLRB v.
Yellow Transp. Co., 709 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1983).
105
Trencor Inc. v. NLRB, 110 F.3d 268, 276 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that it was “unnecessary to
determine the full scope of this court’s support for the Midland doctrine”). See also NLRB v.
Dave Transportation Co., 1999 WL 196545, at *1 n.1 (9th Cir. April 1, 1999) (unpublished)
(noting that they need not decide whether an exception to Midland is warranted); St. Margaret
Memorial Hosp. v. NLRB, 991 F.2d 1146, 1158 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting in dicta that the Midland
rule might not be sufficient in all cases); NLRB v. Affiliated Midwest Hospital, 789 F.2d 524,
528 n.3 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting that it need not reach the issue of whether the circuit should
recognize an exception to Midland).
106
Florida Mining & Materials Corp., 198 N.L.R.B. 601, enf'd 481 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1973).
107
Id.
108
Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
109
Id. at 1239-40.
110
Id.
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communications to the employees at their home address. Unions have taken
advantage of the lists for this purpose.111
Although the Excelsior decision facilitates greater information disclosure,
the Board and the courts have otherwise failed to pursue this goal. There is no
structured forum in which the union is given a chance to make its case to
employees. If the union wishes to speak with employees, it must do so off-site
and outside of working hours. An employer, by contrast, can require
employees to attend a meeting in which it presents an anti-union case. Such
meetings, known as “captive audience speeches,” give employers a much better
opportunity to make their case to employees.112
Union access to employees even in public places can be restricted by the
employer. In Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,113 the Supreme Court held that
employers could prohibit all non-employee solicitation and distribution,
including union solicitation, on its retail parking lot. The Court ruled that the
employer’s property rights trumped the union’s right to access unless the union
could show that the employees could not be reached by other means. The
burden of proving such lack of access was a “heavy one,” as there was a
presumption that the employees could be reached unless they actually lived on
the employer’s property.114 A recent Board decision has extended Lechmere to

111

In their empirical study of thirty-one union representation elections, Getman, Goldberg and
Herman found that employers sent written materials to employees in twenty-six of those
elections, while union sent written materials in twenty-five. JULIUS G. GETMAN ET AL., UNION
REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY 90 (1976). In these elections, 92 percent of
employees reported receiving employer material, while 85 percent reported receiving union
material. Id. Addressing changes in communication technology, one commentator has proposed
that unions be given private employee email addresses as part of the Excelsior disclosure. G.
Micah Wissinger, Informing Workers of the Right to Workplace Representation: Reasonably
Moving from the Middle of the Highway to the Information Superhighway, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
331, 342-43 (2003).
112
See Story, supra note AS1, at 415 (noting the “obvious point that allowing employers to hold
such meetings, especially absent an opportunity for the union to do likewise, gives employers a
strong advantage over unions”). In their study of 31 union representation elections, Professors
Getman, Goldberg, and Herman found that employers held captive-audience meetings in 28 of
those elections, making such meetings more frequent than the distribution of written materials.
GETMAN ET AL., supra note JG1, at 90-92. Employee attendance at such meetings was high. Id.
Although unions held off-site meetings in many of the 31 elections, a much smaller percentage of
employees reported attending such meetings. Id. The authors note that those employees who did
attend union meetings were much more likely to be union adherents. Id.
113
502 U.S. 527 (1992).
114
Id. at 535, 540. This Board and the courts have permitted union access on employer property
for employees working at a remote lumber camp, NLRB v. Lake Superior Lumber Corp., 167
F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1948); in a company town, NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226
(1949); and at a fish cannery, Chugach Alaska Fisheries, 295 N.L.R.B. 44 (1989).
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allow a grocery store to prohibit nonemployee union organizers from using the
snack bar in its store.115
Employers are allowed considerable leeway in restricting the flow of
information between employees. Although employees are able to solicit their
fellow workers on the job, employers can restrict such solicitations to nonworking hours.116 Moreover, the employer may limit employees to oral
solicitations in working areas.117 The employer can forbid the distribution of
literature in working areas due to the threat of litter and disruption of
productive order.118 Such a prohibition must apply to all such distributions, and
it must be applied neutrally.119
An employer can also extend nondiscriminatory literature prohibitions to company bulletin boards120 and even
computer screen savers.121 An employer also has the right to prohibit
solicitations, including union solicitations, on its own internal e-mail, as long as
it does so non-discriminatorily.122
Such lack of interest in getting information to employees is understandable
under the political model, which allows the parties to generate all of the
necessary information through their campaigns. But it does not comport with
the laboratory conditions model, where information would play a critical role in
establishing the conditions for a fair and reasoned choice.
C. Critiques of the Two Models
The two models of a scientific laboratory and a political election have
found an uneasy coexistence in Board and court jurisprudence. Commentators
have criticized the dichotomy and generally have supported one model over the
other – either implicitly or explicitly. On one side, critics of the laboratory
conditions model have argued that the exacting standard results in too much
litigation over incidents that are unlikely to have any effect on the ultimate
outcome. On the other side, critics of the political election model note that the
hands-off approach gives too much power and input to employers, who exploit
their position to coerce the electorate.
1. The Critique of the Laboratory Model: The Problem of Bureaucratic
Obstruction

115

Farm Fresh, 326 N.L.R.B. 997 (1998). For criticism of the Lechmere decision, see Cynthia L.
Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty after Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. REV. 305 (1994).
116
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
117
Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615 (1962).
118
Id.
119
Marathon LeTourneau Co. v. NLRB, 699 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1983).
120
Honeywell, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 1402 (1982).
121
St. Joseph’s Hospital, 337 N.L.R.B. 94 (2001).
122
E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 919 (1993).
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Critics of the laboratory conditions model have argued that it is wellintentioned but ultimately impossible to enforce. In his standard-setting article
on union representation campaigns, Derek Bok focused his attention on the
“instability” and “[i]nconsistencies” of the Board’s laboratory conditions
doctrine.123 Bok felt that the inconsistencies reflected “a deeper uncertainty
regarding the nature of the election process itself.”124 He claimed that if the
Board’s only guiding principle was to keep employee free from undue
interference, the Board’s regulatory approach would continue to be incoherent
and unstable.125 Instead, Bok argued that the Board should focus on a broader
set of “legitimate interests” held by the parties involved.126
Bok agreed with the Board that there is a strong interest in protecting
employees’ freedom of choice.127 He believed that in actuality, however, there
was little role for law in making the union representation choice more rational.
Bok arrived at this conclusion by breaking down an employee’s union
representation decision into three questions: (1) Are conditions within the plant
satisfactory? (2) To what extent can the union improve on these conditions?
(3) Will representation by the union bring countervailing disadvantages as a
result of dues payments, strikes, or bitterness within the plant?128 While Bok
noted that employees may be “best equipped” to answer the first question of the
three, studies showed that employees misconceive the nature of their problems
and may transfer concerns about other issues into an irrational focus on
wages.129 As to the second question, Bok believed that the employee would be
“hard pressed to decide to what extent a union can improve upon the
situation.”130 He discussed how claims by the union about improvements at
123

Bok, supra note DB1, at 39.
Id. at 40.
125
Id. at 43, 45.
126
Id. at 43.
127
Bok described “freedom of choice” as follows.
We may assume that one basic purpose of an election is to permit
the voters to make as rational, and hence as accurate, a decision as
they can concerning the issue before them. In the context of a
representation election, a rational decision implies that employees
have access to relevant information, that they use this data to
determine the possible consequences of selecting or rejecting the
union, and that they appraise these possibilities in light of their own
values and desires to determine whether a vote for the union
promises to promote or impair their interests.
Id. at 46.
128
Id. at 49.
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Id. (citing BURLEIGH B. GARDNER & DAVID G. MOORE, HUMAN RELATIONS IN INDUSTRY (4th
ed. 1964); F.J. ROETHLISBERGER & WILLIAM J. DICKSON, MANAGEMENT AND THE WORKER
(1939)).
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Bok, supra note DB1, at 49.
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other companies would be rebutted by the employer in ways that employees
would be “in a poor position to resolve.”131 Regarding the third question, Bok
argued that employees would be “particularly handicapped” in resolving this
issue, as the answer depended on resolving a series of sub-issues for which
there would often be “little evidence beyond partisan statements of employers
and organizers and the anecdotal accounts of associates . . . .”132
Bok thus made clear that he believed informational difficulties stood in the
way of employees making rational representation decisions. As he noted,
employees generally have little direct, personal information about the union,
and there is little such information or analysis in the media and other
independent sources.133 Given the lack of information on critical questions,
Bok argued that employees were not making rational economic decisions by
sifting the evidence. Instead, they were basing their votes on irrelevant factors
such as: the skillfulness of the union’s organizing strategy, the employer’s
response to the organizing drive, the “likability” of both union and employer
representatives, the opinions of certain “key employees” within the plant,
community opinion of unions generally, and the background and past
experiences of each employee.134 But ultimately, Bok concluded there was no
rational economic calculus behind these elections. If employees were not using
the campaign to get important information about their choice, then the need to
maintain its pristine intellectual conditions is less important as well.
Bok saw empirical support for his views in Union Representation
Elections: Law and Reality by Julius Getman, Stephen Goldberg, and Jeanne
Herman.135
The book essentially summarized a large-scale empirical
investigation into the decisions made during a union representation election. In
a study remarkable for its breadth as well as for the administrative hurdles it
overcame,136 the authors examined thirty-one union representation elections
between 1972 and 1973.137 The authors orchestrated interviews of 1,239
employees who participated in these elections.138 The interviews were
conducted in two waves; first, as soon as possible after the NLRB directed an
election to take place, and then again after the election.139 In the first wave,
131
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Id. at 51.
135
See GETMAN ET AL., supra note JG1, at xi-xiii (foreword by Derek Bok).
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interviewers sought to assess the employee’s pre-campaign sentiments about
union representation, their own working conditions, and how they intended to
vote.140 In the second wave, employees were asked how and why they voted as
well as what they remembered from the representation campaign.141 The
authors then analyzed the results to determine what factors went into
employees’ voting decisions, including the effects of employer and union
campaign efforts.
The headline for the study is that the votes of 81 percent of the employees
could be predicted from their pre-campaign attitudes about their job and about
unions.142 The study also found that employees who had an intent to vote a
particular way prior to the campaign generally ended up voting that way: 94
percent of employees intending to vote for the company did so, as did 82
percent of those intending to vote for the union.143 The authors were able to
predict the outcome of 29 out of the 31 elections based on how employees
intended to vote.144 They thus argue that these results disprove the Board’s
assumption that free choice is fragile and employees will be significantly
influenced by the campaign.145 This conclusion was supported by the study’s
findings that employees remembered only a small percentage of issues from the
campaign and, therefore, were “not generally attentive to the campaign.”146
Interestingly, the authors state the following about employee “rationality” with
regard to the campaign:
The fact that employees do not pay close attention to the
campaign does not mean that the voting decision is irrational.
An employee who votes consistently with his pre-campaign
attitudes is acting in a wholly rational manner. His choice, to be
sure, may not be reasoned in the sense in which the Board
contemplates – based on a careful weighing of the campaign
arguments put forth by each party – but that does not make it
any less rational.147
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The study also specifically examined the effects of unlawful employer
campaigning on representation election results. It found that employers had
engaged in unlawful campaigning in 22 out of the 31 elections.148 In nine of
those elections, the employer committed campaign violations serious enough to
warrant a bargaining order.149 Despite this high level of misconduct, however,
the study found generally no correlation between voting behavior and this
illegal activity. While noting that employees who signed union cards did in fact
vote in significantly higher numbers against the union in elections marred by
unlawful campaigning, the authors detected no such effects on employees who
were undecided, employees who intended to vote for the union, or employees
whose prior attitudes predicted a union vote.150 Even the firing of union
supporters did not result in a significant change in voting behavior.151
Given these findings, Getman, Goldberg and Herman argue that the Board
should drastically cut back on its regulation of representation elections.
Campaign speech, according to the authors, “should be as free of governmental
restrain as speech in political elections.”152 Grants of benefits should be
allowed.153 Bargaining orders should be rare, as the election result, even if
tainted, is likely to reflect the wishes of employees.154 However, the authors do
moderate from this “hands-off” model in several instances. They recommend
harsher penalties, such as treble damages, for illegal discharges during the
campaign.155 In addition, they argue in favor of equal opportunities for unions
and employers to address the workers during work time on employer premises.
Noting the employer’s significant advantage in communicating with
employees, the authors argue that “an employer who holds campaign meetings
on working time and premises should be required to allow the union (or unions)
to hold such meetings on working time and premises.”156 Comparing the
election again to the political process, the authors state: “It is fundamental to
the democratic process that each party should have a roughly equal opportunity
to communicate with the electorate, regardless of the effectiveness of that
communication.”157
Getman, Goldberg, and Herman’s study was primarily criticized for its
failure to blame employer coercion for the decreasing rate of private-employee
148
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unionization.158 As commentators pointed out, many of the statistics heralded
by the authors as proof of campaign irrelevance could be read much more
ambiguously.159 In fact, according to one reading of the study’s data, the study
shows that unions would have won 46% to 47% of elections if they had been
entirely free from illegal behavior, and 3% to 10% if the employers had
campaigned at the highest level of illegality shown in the study.160 More
generally, critics of the study have leveled the same attacks as they do against
the political election model more generally: they claim its fails to account
sufficiently for the insidious effects of employer coercion.
2. The Critique of the Political Election Model: The Problem of Employer
Coercion
In contrast to Bok, Getman, and others who discount the effects of the
representation campaign, other commentators criticize federal labor policy for
its failure to contain the campaign’s effects. In his article on reforming the
representation election,161 Paul Weiler argued that the steady decline in union
representation results in substantial part from a marked increase in employer
coercion and illegal tactics directed at union campaigns and supporters.162 To
prove this point, Weiler relied on statistics about two general trends. First,
Weiler noted that the rate of union victories in representation campaigns
dropped from 74% in 1950 to 48% in 1980.163 At the same time, the number of
unfair labor practice claims filed against employers rose from 4,472 claims in
1950 to 31,281 claims in 1980, with the percentage of meritorious claims rising
slightly.164 Putting these two trends together, Weiler argued that the decrease in
union representation is correlated with the increase in employer unfair labor
practices. For further proof, Weiler compared the U.S. data with Canadian
data. Canada had roughly three times the rate of increasing union density from
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new union certifications, as well as one-sixth the number of discriminatory
discharge complaints per election.165
According to Weiler, weak remedies for unfair labor practices, combined
with lengthy delays in the representation and remediation process, encouraged
an atmosphere of employer coercion and lawbreaking. In order to stem the tide
of this illegal campaigning, Weiler argued not for greater penalties, but instead
for the elimination of the campaign process itself. Instead of a two-month
campaign between initial filing and actual election, Weiler advocated for an
“instant” (five days or less) election.166 Such a brief period would prevent
employers from sustaining prolonged campaign offenses replete with unfair
labor practices and other tactics of intimidation.167
Weiler acknowledged that the purpose of a union representation system is
“to nurture and protect employee freedom of choice with respect to collective
bargaining.”168 However, Weiler argued that the U.S. model overplays the
significance of the union to employees by treating the union as “a quasigovernmental authority over the employees.”169 By allowing the employer to
participation in the campaign during a substantial period of time, the NLRA
had in effect stated that “the employer is legitimately entitled to play the same
role in a representation campaign against the union that the Republican Party
plays in a political campaign against the Democrats.”170 As Weiler argued, this
is strange – the union is seeking to represent employees in their relationship
with the employer, in a context in which employees and employers often have
adverse interests.171 A more apt analogy, according to Weiler, would be
allowing foreign governments to have a role in our political campaigns.172 If
anything, this is too weak; perhaps a better analogy would be allowing your
spouse to have a say in who you hire as your divorce attorney.
Weiler did recognize “one final defense” for proponents of the current
system: namely, the election campaign as “an aid to informed employee
choice.”173 The employer serves as a proxy supporter for those employees who
do not support the union and provides them with resources, arguments, and
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organization.174 Weiler was not persuaded, however, based on his analysis of
the costs and benefits to such a system. He believed that the employer had a
fair opportunity to make its case prior to the representation election; that U.S.
workers were not unsophisticated about unions; and that employers would have
a chance to make their case about working conditions during negotiations with
the union.175 Weiler concluded: “The contribution made by the election
campaign to the enlightenment of the employees is marginal at best.”176
Other commentators agree that the political model has “subverted labor’s
right to representation.”177 Delving into Wagner Act legislative history as well
as early Board decisions, Craig Becker developed how the democratic political
campaign had become the “legitimating metaphor” for the Wagner Act and
collective bargaining more generally.178 However, early Board decisions had
not required a secret-ballot election in determining representation and, more
importantly, had held that the employer had no role to play in the campaign
process.179 It was not until the Supreme Court and the Taft-Hartley Act
intervened that the Board was required to have secret-ballot elections and to
allow the employer the right to present its case.180
Once the electoral model was imposed on the representation campaign, the
Board’s regulation of the process vacillated between a laissez-faire political
model and the much stricter laboratory conditions model.181 The laboratory
conditions model is thus seen as a response to the employer’s new role: in order
to restrain the effects of employer participation, the Board needed to lay down
strict requirements on electioneering. Commentators have criticized Board
regulations based on the dissonance between these concepts.182 But as Becker
pointed out, the political analogy itself is inapt. Employers are not competing
against unions in a neutral election, but rather are attempting to influence an
election in an arena where they hold ultimate power.183 The answer, according
to Becker, is not to embrace the freewheeling regulation of the political model
but rather to get rid of the political analogy and its trappings.184 Becker’s
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prescription is to strip employers of “any legally cognizable interest in their
employees’ election of representatives.”185
What exactly would this mean? Becker did not propose that employers
must remain neutral during representation campaigns. Instead, he argued that
employers should not have any official role in the election process. Thus,
employers would have no grounds to contest the unit or otherwise participate in
representation hearings.186 Employers would not have the right to challenge
elections or voters, and thus would not have the right to place observers at the
polls.187 More generally, campaign rules would attempt to prevent employers
from “exploiting their singular economic power to persuade employees.”188
Thus, employers would not be permitted to host any “captive audience”
campaign presentations.189 They would be bound to follow the rules on
solicitation and distribution that they laid down for union representatives.190
Although Becker’s proposal thus seems to allow for employer speech as long as
similar opportunities are offered to the union, he did state that “[i]t is but a short
step to the realization that all employer speech to employees during working
hours, at the workplace, is speech to a captive audience.”191
Becker’s rhetoric is firmly set against any participation by the employer in
representation campaigns. But his proposed solution allows employers to
continue to have a role in the election process, albeit a non-legally-sanctioned
one. Like the critics of the laboratory conditions model, he is not willing to
commit to the logical extension that his ideas would require. The reason,
perhaps, is that both sets of critics are missing the critical role that campaigns
and employers play, albeit imperfectly, in providing information to employees
about their representation decision.

PART II: THE UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTION AS A PURCHASE OF SERVICES
In considering the regulation of the union representation election, the
Board, courts, and commentators have vacillated between the paradigms of
scientific laboratory and political election. These wildly disparate frameworks
have led to incoherence in representation campaign regulation. Moreover,
these frameworks represent a deep disagreement over the nature of the election
itself. Proponents of the political model believe that the NLRB has swamped a
185
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balanced and democratic process with a flood of complicated regulations.
Believing that most employees have already made up their minds, they argue
for a hands-off approach to the campaign. Their reforms focus on cutting down
red tape in order to secure election results more quickly and enable participants
to settle in to the post-election reality. Proponents of the laboratory-conditions
approach argue that employer coercion and disapproval are what swamp
employees during the election campaign.
For them, participation in
representation campaigns allows employers to cow their employees through
legal and illegal means. Although some acknowledge a role for the
representation campaign, they generally believe that employers’ roles in those
campaigns should be greatly reduced or even eliminated.
There is a simpler and more elegant paradigm to apply. The union
representation election is, at root, a decision to purchase group representation
services. Employees are agreeing to pay the union in return for the services that
the union provides. Because of the nature of the services, the decision cannot
be made individually. Thus, the election is used to determine whether most
employees desire to purchase these services.
This seemingly straightforward concept has not taken root in the
jurisprudence or the literature surrounding the representation election.
However, it provides the best paradigm for the election and it concomitant
campaign, and pieces of it have shone though in some discussions in the past.
This part further develops why the “purchase of services” paradigm is most
applicable.
A. The Services
Employees choose unions because of the services they provide. The
services offered relate to representation of a group of employees in their
negotiations with an employer. The union is the sole representative of the
employees in bargaining over terms and conditions of employment.192 It
manages the strategy of negotiations, strikes, lockouts, and other weapons of
“economic warfare.”193 Once a contract has been negotiated, the union
administers the agreement and, if the agreement includes arbitration, represents
individual employees in grievances against the employer. By electing the union

192

In some industries, most notably professional sports, unions negotiate basic framework
agreements, and individual players are able to negotiate individual terms and conditions (often
through agents).
193
The metaphor of “economic warfare” has often been used in discussing the union-employer
relationship. See, e.g., New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 440 U.S.
519, 530 (1979) (“. . . Congress intended to forbid state regulation of economic warfare between
labor and management, even though it was clear that none of the regulated conduct on either side
was covered by the federal statute.”).

INFORMATION AND THE UNION REPRESENTATION MARKET

29

as their representative, employees have essentially designated the union as their
representative in exchange for the payment of dues.
The most analogous service would be representation of individual
employees in their negotiations with an employer – a sports or entertainment
agent, for example. However, representation by a union has several important
differences. First, an agent represents employees on an individualized basis.
The union represents a collection of employees – all of the employees within a
designated bargaining unit. Second, employees who vote against the union
must still pay for the representation services they provide (except in right-towork states).194 Individual employees, on the other hand, have individualized
agreements and thus have sole control over the decision. Third, the NLRA
gives the union certain statutory rights as the employee’s collective bargaining
representative. The employer must, for example, bargain with the union over
any changes to mandatory terms and conditions of employment.195 Individual
agents, on the other hand, generally work within the common-law contractual
framework and have no special rights, outside those negotiated between the
employer and the employee or, in some cases, the employer and a union.
Despite these differences, the purpose of unions and individual agents
remains much the same – to secure better terms and conditions of employment
for their workers. Thus, an economically rational decision to vote for or against
a union would be based on whether the employee expects that the union will, in
fact, improve terms and conditions.196 Legal commentators have recognized
this conclusion, even as they fail to apply its ramifications. For example, Derek
Bok wrote that the union representation decision rests on into three questions:
(1) Are conditions within the plant satisfactory? (2) To what extent can the
union improve on these conditions? (3) Will representation by the union bring
countervailing disadvantages as a result of dues payments, strikes, or bitterness
within the plant?197 These questions simply break down the overall utility
194
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question. On the other side, Paul Weiler agrees that employees will make a
judgment about the value that the union brings to the table. However, he
believes that the best time for employees to make that judgment is during
contract negotiations, after the union has already been chosen.198
Instead of being trumpeted or refuted, the purchase-of-services paradigm
has instead been largely ignored. The laboratory conditions model focuses on
the “uninhibited desires” of employees, either for or against unionization,199 but
treats this desire as an essence to be distilled. It is hard to say what this essence
would be, other than a desire to secure the union’s representation services. The
political election paradigm treats the decision as a choice between the employer
and the union as to who will govern in the workplace. But the employer retains
ultimate power over the workplace in any event; if the union wins, it simply
secures certain representational rights.200 Thus, the political election paradigm
misrepresents the true nature of the choice.
Perhaps the best counterargument to the purchase-of-services paradigm is
the notion that the union is merely a collection of employees who joined
together to exercise their communal rights in bargaining with the employer.
But this model represents only the smallest fraction of union representation
under the Act. Although occasionally a group of employees will form a “labor
organization” amongst themselves, the overwhelming majority of unions are
outside organizations that seek to represent employees at a variety of different
employers. Unions are independent institutions with their own set of internal
procedures, leadership, and employees. They generally have complete
discretion in handling negotiations with employers. A union may even execute
a collective bargaining agreement without any approval by the represented
employees.201 The union is the employees’ representative; it is not a
representation of them.
In fact, the appeal of unions is that they have the ability to get more for
employees than the employees would get on their own. Part of this may stem
from a union’s ability to represent a large group
198

Weiler, supra note PW1, at 1811 (“Rather than decide on the basis of easily made promises in
a representation campaign that takes place months before serious negotiations begin, the
employees can see what their employer actually offers at the bargaining table, compare these
offers with what their union demands, and then make up their minds whether to take the risks and
make the sacrifices necessary to achieve a favorable collective agreement.”).
199
General Shoe, 77 N.L.R.B. at 127.
200
See 79 CONG. REC. 9682 (1935) (remarks of Rep. Griswold), reprinted in 2 NLRA
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note NLRAH, at 3109 (noting under the Wagner Act, employees
would not “control anything except the selection of [their] representatives”); Becker, supra note
CB1, at 581 (“The union election vests labor's representative with no sovereignty in the
workplace. It is on this point – the legal authority of the union to govern – that the analogy
between industrial and political democracy is most tenuous.”).
201
Alan Hyde, Democracy in Collective Bargaining, 93 YALE L.J. 793, 810 (1984).

INFORMATION AND THE UNION REPRESENTATION MARKET

31

of employees across companies and thus control the labor supply in a particular
region and industry. Also important, however, is the union’s ability to
represent all of the employees in a particular group at a particular employer
with one (solitary) voice.202
The union’s prowess in conducting the
negotiations, including its knowledge of the law and its ability to be informed
about the industry practices, also contributes value to the employees. These
services are what lead to the resulting better terms and conditions that
successful unions secure for their employees.
Finally, the notion that union members are only paying “dues” may also
contribute to the idea of union as a voluntary association of workers pursuing
mutual gain. But dues are simply individual payments for the costs of the
services that are being provided. Employees represented by a union are not
forced to join the union if they do not wish to. But all covered employees must
pay for the costs of the services that the union provides.203 Congress permitted
a union to charge nonmembers on the theory that nonmembers would be
essentially free riding on the union’s services if payments were not made.204 In
the Beck decision, the Supreme Court chose to differentiate between different
components of the dues, and ruled that non-members need not pay the union for
services that are not directly related to collective bargaining services.205 This
somewhat cabined view of union representation helps makes the point that
represented employees are paying for a service – that of union representation.206
B. The Providers
Another factor in our conceptualization of the employee-union relationship
is the nature of the union itself. The NLRA has a fairly broad definition of a
“labor organization”: it is “any organization of any kind, or any agency or
202
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employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and
which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers
concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of
employment, or conditions of work.”207 Theoretically, under the NLRA a labor
union could take a variety of forms: for-profit corporation, nonprofit
corporation, partnership, LLC, voluntary association, or even sole
proprietorship. However, unions representing employees under the NLRA are
almost always nonprofit associations.
There seem to be three functional reasons for this phenomenon. First, the
Clayton Act provides antitrust exemption for those labor organizations
“instituted for the purposed of mutual help, and not having capital stock or
conducted for profit.”208 This exemption thus excludes for-profit unions.
Second, nonprofit status affords tax benefits.209 Third, the requirements of the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act would be difficult to meet
for organizations other than nonprofit associations. Under the LMRDA, unions
must give their members “equal rights and privileges within such organization
to nominate candidates, to vote in elections or referendums of the labor
organization, to attend membership meetings, and to participate in the
deliberations and voting upon the business of such meetings.”210 Dues can only
be increased through a vote by the majority of the membership.211 Unions must
file extensive reports with the Department of Labor regarding assets, liabilities,
salaries, and other proprietary information.212 In addition, the LMRDA
imposes strict fiduciary duty requirements on union officers and employees.213
It would be difficult to construct a for-profit organization that could meet these
regulatory requirements. And the definition of labor organization under the
LMRDA is also fairly broad, meaning that almost all unions representing
employees under the NLRA must meet the LMRDA’s requirements.214
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Because of their organizational form, unions may not be conceptualized as
players in the commercial realm. But they provide representation services in
return for payment. In this regard, they are similar to other nonprofit
organizations that provide services for a market price: so-called “commercial”
nonprofits.215 Like many hospitals, day care centers, and nursing homes,
unions are “nonprofits that receive no significant amount of donations, but
derive their income almost exclusively from prices charged for private goods
and service they deliver to paying customers.”216 The rationales provided for
the nonprofit form in the commercial context generally relate to the nature of
the product and customers. As Henry Hansmann has argued, “nonprofit firms
commonly arise where customers are in a peculiarly poor position to determine,
with reasonable cost and effort, the quality or the quantity of the services they
receive from a firm.”217 As will be discussed below, employees are in a
particularly poor position to judge the quality of union representation services
prior to securing those services.218 Moreover, like colleges and nursing homes,
unions generally provide services in which the customer becomes “locked in”
for a period of time.219
It may seem strange that the members of the union are also its customers.
But this organizational form is not unique. Customer-owned enterprises are
common in many industries.220 In addition, unions bear a close resemblance –
in their organizational form – to for-profit public corporations.221 Stockholders
in a public company can be likened to members, in that they vote for the
leadership that manages the organization from day to day. Both members and
stockholders are the “citizens” of the polity that can vote in or vote out those
who run the organization. At the same time, stockholders are also likened to
customers for purposes of the securities laws; they are provided with a vast
array of consumer protections, such as mandatory disclosure and antifraud
causes of action.222 The notion that stockholders control the organization but
also look to the organization for financial rewards finds common ground with
the perspective of union members.
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Without the antitrust, tax, and LMRDA provisions which make the
nonprofit form a necessity, unions might find that a for-profit organizational
form would better serve their organizational needs.223 However, even as
nonprofits, unions fit comfortably within the collection of commercial
nonprofits that provide services to paying customers and may even make a
profit.224
C. The Decision to Purchase
The “purchase of services” paradigm may also encounter difficulty in
considering the method of the purchase. Unlike an individual consumer
decision, employees can only purchase union representation services by a
majority vote. If a majority of employees vote in favor of union representation,
all employees receive those services and must pay the cost of those services. If
a majority of employees vote against union representation, than none of the
employees can enjoy the benefits of that representation. Since most consumer
transactions can be made individually and voluntarily, the notion of workers
being compelled to pay for services they do not want cuts against the notion of
employees as consumers. Moreover, the notion that the decision is made by an
election is also anathema to the usual purchase of services. Elections are
decisions about institutional leadership; purchases are decisions about personal
needs and preferences.
The odd structure of the purchasing decision, however, can be accounted
for by the nature of the service being purchased. The services are not
individualized services, but rather are provided to the group. Payment by all
those who enjoy the services is necessary in order to prevent free-riding. But
that necessitates that some employees may be forced to pay for services they do
not want. Of course, that occurs every day in consumer transactions: service
providers may not provide the exact services that individual consumers want,
and consumers may end up paying for services they would choose not to
take.225 Other service providers, such as neighborhood associations, also
223

See Samuel Estreicher, Deregulating Union Democracy, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 501, 51617 (arguing that the Clayton Act and the LMRDA should be amended to allow for-profit unions).
Henry Hansmann argues more generally that many commercial nonprofits may also be efficiently
reorganized as for-profits. HANSMANN, supra note HH1, at 234-35 (arguing that nonprofits offer
a “crude form of consumer protection” that may not be sufficient to justify the other
inefficiencies of the nonprofit organizational form).
224
Nonprofits are only constrained from distributing their profits to persons who exercise control
over the firm. This constraint may explain the types of corruption demonstrated by certain union
leadership. See Estreicher, supra note SE1, at 512-13 (noting that union leaders may plow profits
into excessive amenities, office buildings, perks, and salaries).
225
For example, cable television purchasers can only buy certain packages with a pre-set
selection of television channels. As a result, they may end up paying for channels they would
otherwise choose not to take. In addition, home purchasers may often have to pay dues to
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impose mandatory fees on those who receive services, even if individual
customers would choose to reject those services. The key elements are that: (a)
the services can only be provided to a group, and (b) there needs to be some
mechanism for allowing the group to choose those services, even if some group
members might disagree.
An election is one possible mechanism for making that choice. However,
on its face, the consumer model would seem to favor a system of card-check
certification. If a majority of employees choose to have union representation,
there should be no need for an election: the majority has already expressed its
will. The election, however, is designed to protect employees against coercion,
specifically union coercion, and is also designed to provide information to
employees about their decision.
Since the generation of information is a key justification for the
representation election, it is surprising that the Board, courts, and commentators
have generally overlooked its importance. Indeed, there are reasons to believe
that the union representation decision is particularly in need of oversight with
respect to the information that employees have in making their decision. The
information problems in the market for union representation raise particular
concerns about the economic rationality and efficiency of those decisions.

PART III: INFORMATION DEFICIENCIES IN THE MARKET FOR UNION
REPRESENTATION
Rational decisions to exchange goods or services – in other words, trade –
are the key mechanisms to improving our individual and societal welfare.226
Contracts are the legal mechanism for enforcing trades in our economic system.
According to economic theory, contracts should be enforced because of their
Pareto optimality: they increase the utility of all of the parties to the
exchange.227 Of course, there can be contractual winners and losers; many
nonprofit neighborhood associations, whether they would independently choose to or not. See
Sarah Max, Hate Your Homeowners Association?, CNN Money, April 22, 2004, at:
http://money.cnn.com/2004/03/09/pf/yourhome/homeownersassociation/index.htm
(“Homeowners are obligated to pay [association] dues – which can be anything from $100 to
$10,000 a year, depending on the neighborhood and its amenities.”).
226
The stereotypical beginning to every microeconomics course is the discussion of utility
involving two people each with a large supply of one good. One may have peanut butter, for
example, and the other grape jam. The professor demonstrates how each party will be better off
if they trade some of their good for some of the other party’s good. For example, if Jack has ten
jars of peanut butter and trades three of his jars for three jars of Jane’s jam, both Jack and Jane
will be better off.
227
See Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability
Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD.
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contracts are about hedging risk, and one party may end up regretting the
decision to contract after the fact. But when the contract is created, both parties
agree to it (per economic doctrine) because they believe it increases their net
present utility.
However, for contractual exchanges to be Pareto optimal, they must use the
proper data, or “perfect information.”228 If the data is faulty, the results will be
faulty, no matter how logical the decisionmaker.229 To what extent do we
simply trust parties to gather information for themselves? The common law of
contract has long struggled with how to manage information in the bargaining
process.
From the beginning courts have prohibited fraud – i.e.,
misrepresentations about information material to the contract. However, the
definition of “fraud” has long extended to omissions in disclosure as well as
affirmative misrepresentations, as the famous case of Laidlaw v. Organ230
attests. Many scholars have attempted to provide a theoretical basis for
determining when parties to a contract negotiation have a duty to disclose
material information.231 Although one might say that, in the absence of a
fiduciary relationship, there is no common law requirement to disclose, this is
an overstatement.232 In fact, in a number of instances, courts have required
parties to disclose information, or they will risk rescission or even liability for
fraud.233
283, 284 (1995) ("In the area of contract law, the efficiency argument concludes that courts
should enforce all voluntary contracts that do not produce negative externalities, regardless of
their distributive consequences. If a contract is voluntary, then it presumptively improves the
well-being of both parties.").
228
See DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 87
(1994) (defining perfect information as “all relevant information about the market including the
price and quality of the product”); Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost
Consumer Credit: The Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REV. 807, 881
(2003) (“Without accurate information about the quality and especially the price of any good, no
person can minimize their opportunity costs, since they cannot compare the value of that product
to their next best option. Thus, in a policymaking system of private decisionmaking, where
individuals act without accurate cost information, there is no policymaking at all, rather just the
random and often tragic outcomes of market anarchy.”).
229
Or, as the saying goes, “garbage in, garbage out.” See Webopedia, garbage in, garbage out,
available at: http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/g/garbage_in_garbage_out.html.
230
15 U.S. 178 (1817). At issue in Laidlaw was a contract for the sale of tobacco made at the
close of the War of 1812. The buyer knew that the war had ended and, with that, the British
blockade that had reduced the value of tobacco. The Supreme Court ruled that while there was
no requirement for the buyer to disclose the information, he had a duty not to “impose upon” the
buyer if the failure to answer the question was misleading. Id. at 194.
231
Kimberly D. Krawiec & Kathryn Zeiler, Common Law Disclosure Duties and the Sin of
Omission: Testing the Meta-theories 91 VA. L. REV. 1795, 1796 (2005) (noting that “[d]ozens of
law reviews” have dealt with this “hotly debated question[]”).
232
Id.
233
See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (SECOND) § 161 (listing four general exceptions).
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To a large extent, however, the common law of contractual disclosure has
been superseded by a variety of statutory schemes that endeavor to regulate
information in the context of particular markets. A variety of consumer
protection laws focus in part on providing information about critical aspects of
the product.234 The Food & Drug Administration requires extensive labeling on
prepackaged food products in order to inform the public about ingredients,
calories, and fat content.235 The Truth in Lending Act requires the disclosure of
interest rates in understandable terms. 236 Perhaps most famously, the
Securities Act of 1933237 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934238 instituted
a sweeping program of regulation based primarily on required disclosure.
These statutes are designed to empower the consumer to make efficient
decisions by having the proper information.239
Surprisingly, however, concerns about consumer information have not been
raised about the choice for union representation. One might think that the
presence of relevant information would be critical under the laboratory
conditions model. But the model has been used primarily to keep problematic
information out, rather than making sure the proper information gets in. The
political election model assumes that the two “parties” will generate the
information between themselves that is sufficient for the employees to make
their decision.

234

For example, the federal Moss-Magnuson Warranty Act requires disclosure about warranties
on consumer products. See Joan Vogel, Squeezing Consumers: Lemon Laws, Consumer
Warranties, and a Proposal for Reform, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 589, 610 (“The basic goal of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act is to improve the warranty information available to consumers by
providing for full disclosure of all written warranty terms in a clear and concise manner.”).
235
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 371(a), 393(b)(2)(A) (2000); 21 C.F.R. § 101.9 (2006); U.S. Food and Drug
Administration, What FDA Regulates, available at: http://www.fda.gov/comments/regs.html.
For discussion of a particular change in the regulations, see Food & Drug Admin., Food
Labeling: Trans Fatty Acids in Nutrition Labeling, Nutrient Content Claims, and Health Claims,
68 Fed. Reg. 41434 (July 11, 2003).
236
Peterson, supra note CP1, at 880 (“The most important requirements of the Truth in Lending
provisions centered around the disclosure of the cost of credit based on standard uniform
requirements set out by the act and by the Federal Reserve Board.”). See also Matthew A.
Edwards, Empirical and Behavioral Critiques of Mandatory Disclosure: Socio-Economics and
the Quest for Truth in Lending, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 199, 212-16 (2005) (discussing
TILA policies).
237
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a – 77aa (2000).
238
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a – 78mm (2000).
239
See, e.g., Peterson, supra note CP1, at 883 (“Unlike interest rate caps and other control
devices, disclosure regulation – at least in theory – increases the freedom of consumers through
giving the opportunity to open one's own eyes. With a uniform method of learning the costs and
characteristics of credit contracts, debtors can determine which credit contracts are in their best
interests.”).
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Yet there are strong reasons to believe that consumers do not get the
appropriate information about the pros and cons of union representation in the
context of the campaign. These reasons are discussed more fully below.
A. Information Asymmetry.
As noted above, the basic common law contractual paradigm assumes that
parties to a contract will obtain their own information. Although the common
law prohibits fraud and requires truthful disclosure in response to questioning,
there is no general duty to disclose information. In limited circumstances, such
as the sale of a home, courts require disclosure of known defects.240 For the
most part, however, requiring disclosure of information more generally is seen
as dampening the incentive to find this information in the first place.241
Moreover, in most cases the market will provide incentives for participants
to disclose information voluntarily. Consumers will not buy a product unless
they know something about it. If a seller fails to disclose sufficient
information, consumers will demand the information; those sellers that provide
it will sell more products.242 Sellers have an incentive to provide enough
information so that buyers can identify their product and judge for themselves
whether they want the product and at what cost.243
Of course, it may be possible for a market to fail to provide such
information on its own. For reasons discussed further below, market
participants may have incentives to reveal insufficient information about the
product, leading eventually to market failure. One of the most famous
examples of such a situation is the market for used cars as modeled by George
Akerlof.244 As described by Akerlof, the sellers of used cars have much more
information about the true quality of the car than do sellers. Moreover, it is
difficult to correct this information asymmetry, given the inability of most
buyers to determine quality or to trust a seller’s purported information
240

See, e.g., Hill v. Jones, 725 P.2d 1115, 1119 (Ariz. 1986) (requiring the seller to disclose
material facts about a home when such facts are not readily observable and not known to the
buyer (citing Johnson v. Davis, 480 So.2d 625, 629 (Fla. 1985)).
241
RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 111 (6th ed. 2003).
242
We may need information to get us interested in contracting in the first place. Of course,
advertising is to some extent hype and persuasion, but it is also information. See, e.g., CARLTON
& PERLOFF, supra note CP1, at 602-04 (discussing the difference between informational
advertising and persuasive advertising).
243
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection
of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 681, 714 (1984) (noting that information is generally left to the
market “because of a conclusion that people who make or use a product (or test it as Consumers'
Union does) will obtain enough of the gains from information to make the markets reasonably
efficient”).
244
George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
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disclosure. Under Akerlof’s model, buyers will be forced to assume that a used
car is a “lemon” and thus will only offer to pay the value of a lemon, regardless
of the car’s actual quality. Those with quality used cars will thus elect to keep
their cars rather than sell them at a drastically reduced value, leaving only those
with actual lemons in the market. Akerlof thus predicts that a downward spiral
may result, in which “it is quite possible to have the bad driving out the not-sobad driving out the medium driving out the no-so-good driving out the good in
such a sequence of events that no market exists at all.”245
The “market for lemons” problem is not confined to used cars. As Bernard
Black has pointed out, securities markets are a “vivid example” of Akerlof’s
market for lemons; “[i]ndeed, they are a far more vivid example than [the]
original example of used cars.”246 Black explains:
Used car buyers can observe the car, take a test drive, have a
mechanic inspect the car, and ask others about their experiences
with the same car model or manufacturer. By comparison, a
company’s shares, when the company first goes public, are like
an unobservable car, produced by an unknown manufacturer, on
which investors can obtain only dry, written information that
they can’t directly verify.247
If investors cannot verify the information they receive about a security, the
market is ripe for exploitation. Knowing this, investors will treat every security
as if they cannot trust the underlying facts about it. This underpricing will
drive the higher quality issuers out of the market, leading to Akerlof’s
downward spiral which completely destroys the market.
Why is information so crucial to the securities markets? A security,
particularly corporate shares, represents a property right in something that
exists only as a fictional person, created through documents filed in a particular
state. Shareholders generally do not run the business; they contribute capital so
that others may run a profitable business and pay the shareholders the residual.
A shareholder trusts the people who run the corporation – officers and directors
– to act as their representatives in running the corporation so as to maximize
shareholder value.248 Although shareholders elect the board of directors, who
245

Id. at 490.
Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48
UCLA L. REV. 781, 786 (2001).
247
Id.
248
Directors are not strictly agents of the corporation; they are in fact more akin to elected
representatives. See, e.g., Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co., Ltd. v. Cunninghame,
2 Ch. 34 (Eng. C.A. 1906) (establishing the right of directors to act contrary to the wishes of a
majority of shareholders as expressed through a resolution); Continental Securities Co. v.
246
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in turn appoint the officers who run the corporation, this power is very difficult
to exercise in a large corporation. Thus, shareholders must be able to trust
directors and officers to use their money appropriately. There is a very real
“agency costs” concern that lies at the heart of much corporate law today.249
Are unions subject to the “market for lemons” problem?
Upon
examination, they are subject to agency cost concerns similar to those of
corporate shareholders. Union members trust that their union dues will be used
by union officials to get them the best terms and conditions of employment
possible. And similar to shareholders, union members have the right to elect
these officials, although that power is similarly attenuated, especially at the
national level.250
Union representation services also have the more general information
asymmetries that contribute to a “market for lemons.” Unions provide services
that are not transparent; they are not easy to judge before purchase.251 The
union promises to improve the employees’ terms and conditions of
employment. How much better will the terms and conditions be? Will the
negotiations proceed easily, or must a painful strike be endured? How effective
will the union be in representing employees in grievance arbitrations? Are
union officials paid the appropriate amount, or are they overpaid? Would they
properly manage my retirement? It is very difficult to know ahead of time what
the union dues will buy.252 Even after purchase, it may be difficult to know the

Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 16 (1912) (“[T]he directors are not ordinary agents . . . . [T]hey are
trustees with the power of controlling the property . . . without hindrance.”).
249
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
250
Stewart J. Schwab, Union Raids, Union Democracy, and the Market for Union Control, 1992
U. ILL. L. REV. 367, 367-68.
251
Id. at 379-80. Products with unobservable qualities are sometimes described as “experience
goods” – namely, goods whose “salient characteristics can only be learned after purchase, by
actual use.” See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of
Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 659 (1979).
Experience goods are contrasted with “search goods,” for which the consumer can establish the
product’s quality prior to purchase. See, e.g., CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note CP1, at 600-01.
Although Schwartz and Wilde generally argue that policymakers have overstated information
problems, they concede that their use of search equilibrium models sheds “relatively little light”
on the question of information with respect to experience goods. Schwartz & Wilde, supra, at
662.
252
The problem applies even after employees have joined the union. See Schwab, supra note
SS1, at 379-80 (“Union members have even greater difficulty monitoring and evaluating their
leaders. Was the last wage increase a good one? Did the leaders work hard at the bargaining
table, or did they shirk? Could tougher negotiations have produced more? Are the union leaders
becoming too cozy -- or too confrontational -- with management? Is the low return from the
pension fund due to improper investments or bad market conditions? Are leaders earning their
salaries? In short, could leaders be doing better?”).
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quality of the union’s negotiating abilities.253 In addition, union services cannot
be trial-tested before purchasing them. It takes a very costly and time
consuming process and agreement by a majority of employees to purchase
union representation services. And as will be discussed below,254 once those
services have been purchased, it is very difficult to get out of them. In voting
for union representation, employees must make a leap of faith: that the money
they pay to the union will be used to better their terms and conditions of
employment, rather than leaving them the same or even making them worse.
Like the decision to buy a stock, the purchaser needs information about the
organization in order to determine whether the benefits of such a decision
outweigh the costs.
But even if employees cannot easily get the necessary information by
looking at the product or from past experience, won’t union and employers
provide the necessary information themselves? As discussed next, there are
reasons to believe that the information will not be properly conveyed.
B. Inverse Employer Incentives
The market for union representation services is constructed as an election.
Employees obtain representation services by voting for such services through a
secret ballot election. As noted earlier,255 the pre-election process is often
analogized to a political campaign in which the union and the employer are
running against each other. In a traditional political campaign, the parties to the
election are expected to generate all the necessary information for voters to
make their decision. Each candidate has an incentive to point out his or her
positive features, as well as his or her opponent’s negative features. Given
these incentives, the voters can expect to get all positive and negative
information about the candidates from the candidates’ pre-election
campaigns.256
253

Goods whose relative quality cannot be determined even after purchase are sometimes
referred to as “credence goods.” Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the
Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J.L. & ECON. 67, 68-69 (1973).
254
See infra Part III.E.
255
See supra Part I.B.
256
Thus, much of the debate surrounding campaign reform has been whether parties have
sufficient funds to get their message out. Those in favor of campaign finance reforms generally
believe that a combination of federal campaign funding and limitations on private donations are
necessary to enable a level informational playing field. See, e.g., Dennis F. Thompson, Two
Concepts of Corruption: Making Campaigns Safe for Democracy, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1036,
1047 (2005) (“[E]lectoral corruption in a campaign occurs insofar as private power employs
influences that are less relevant to the choice between candidates and drives out influences that
are more relevant.”). However, critics believe that limitations of private campaign spending
restrict free speech and curtail the flow of information. See, e.g., Bradley A. Smith, Faulty
Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J.
1049, 1061 (1998) (arguing that any limitations on spending reduce communications).
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In a union representation campaign, the union is seeking, through an
election, to represent a group of the employer’s workers. The union thus has
incentives to present itself in a positive light. Like any seller of services, the
union is trying to persuade its potential customers that they should purchase its
services.257 Union representatives may use a variety of sales techniques that
have been passed down through the centuries. But their incentives are to get
employees to sign up with the union.
The union also has incentives to portray the employer in a negative light.
After all, the union’s services are simply representing employees in their
negotiations with employers over terms and conditions of employment. The
union must therefore convince employees that the employer is not giving them
the best terms and conditions that it could. If a union cannot improve the
employees’ lot, there is no need for its services. So the union must convince
employees that the union could get a better deal. In making this case, the union
may bring out information about the employer that may seem negative to
employees. For example, the union may argue that the employer’s profit
margins are extremely high. The union may argue that the employer is paying
employees much less than other companies in the field pay their workers. The
crux of the case is that the employer is holding back, and the employees need
the union to maximize their contractual benefits.
As Craig Becker has pointed out, the employer is in some respects a third
party to this transaction.258 Whether I hire Jim to represent me in my
negotiations with Earl is really no business of Earl’s. But of course the
employer often will have a strong interest in seeing the union’s election petition
defeated. Union representation may very well mean higher wages and better
benefits for employees. It means extensive bargaining sessions with the union
over the contract.259 If the parties agree to a contract, the employer must inform
the union of any future changes in working conditions and then bargain over
those as well.260 If the parties do not agree to a contract, the employer may face
a strike or unfair labor practice charges for failure to bargain in good faith. For
an employer looking to preserve the contractual status quo as well as its ability
to act independently with regard to employees, there is a very strong interest in
seeing the union defeated.
In such cases the employer will have incentives to disseminate negative
information about the union. Of course, what is negative to the employer – i.e.,
the potential for higher wages – is not a negative for the employees. So the
257
See Estreicher, supra note SE1, at 515 (discussing the market for union representation
services).
258
See Becker, supra note CB1, at 498-500.
259
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2000).
260
See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2000) (requiring employer to inform collective bargaining
representative of changes to terms and conditions of employment).
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employer will look to disseminate information about the union that is negative
from an employee’s perspective. For example, information about the union’s
past ineffectiveness, its wastefulness of union funds, and its inability to live up
to its campaign promises are all useful to the anti-union employer. The
employer will also have incentives to paint itself in a positive light. It will want
to show that it is giving its employees the best deal it can, and that the union
will not be able to get any further concessions from the employer.
However, the previous discussion assumes an employer that does not want
union representation. Although all employers have some incentives to avoid
unionization, due to the added time and expense imposed by bargaining,
employers who have the most incentive to defeat the union are those who have
the most to lose from unionization. And by extension, those employers will
therefore put on the fiercest campaign. However, the employees of such
employers arguably have the least need to get negative information about the
union, since the union would more be likely to help them.261
The converse is also true. In those situations where the union is least likely
to help employees – namely, where the union will not be all that effective in
improving terms and conditions – the employer has the least incentive to wage
a vigorous campaign. These incentives are most skewed when the union has
favorable relations with the employer. Obviously, an employer will not
disseminate negative information about an employer-dominated union. But
such unions are illegal under the NLRA, and the Board has the power to
disempower them (should a claim be filed).262 However, other unions exist
which are known to be more friendly to employers, and more apt to agree to
favorable contracts, but their activities may not cross the line into illegal
collusion. The existence of so-called “sweetheart” unions is an understudied
but undeniable part of the union landscape.263 Employers have no incentives to
campaign against such unions. In fact, an employer has strong incentives to
court such unions, especially if there is a possibility of a good-faith union drive
down the road. As will be discussed below, with a sweetheart union an
employer could lock its employees into a collective bargaining agreement for
three years.264

261

In saying this I recognize that there still is a need for negative information about the union,
even if the employer has a lot to lose from unionization. The union could still be corrupt or
ineffective. My point is that, holding union effectiveness constant, employers have an increasing
incentive to defeat the union as employee benefits from unionization (due to employer
concessions) increase.
262
29 U.S.C. § 8(a)(2) (2000).
263
Michael J. Goldberg, Cleaning Labor’s House: Institutional Reform Litigation in the Labor
Movement, 1989 DUKE L.J. 903, 910-11 (discussing illegal sweetheart contracts).
264
See Part III.E. infra.
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True “sweetheart” deals – ones involving payoffs to union officials – are of
course illegal.265 But there are gradations in the relationships between
employers and unions. A union may simply want to collect a standard set of
dues easily, and thus will comply with most of management’s demands with
little fuss. Unions that have a “friendlier” relationship with management are
not necessarily pernicious, and may in fact do the best job of representing their
employees. But it is nevertheless true that the better the relationship, the less
likely it is that the employer will campaign against the union. The desire of the
employer to provide negative information about the union is related to the
employer’s fear of unionization. And because the union and the employer have
conflicting interests, incentives for the employer to provide negative
information about the union may be the lowest when structurally the need for
such information is the highest.
C. Absence of Competition between Unions
Markets depend in large part on competition within the market to provide
the necessary information about the quality of goods and services.266
Advertising is often centered around a comparison between one product and
another, attempting to show why the advertised product is superior. In
addition, sellers have incentives to provide information based on market
pressure from other competitors. If other firms are revealing information about
their product that consumers find useful, even if that information is mixed, an
individual firm will be punished by consumers if it does not provide
comparable information. If there is only one firm in the market, however, that
firm will have much greater leverage in setting consumer expectations about the
level of information disclosure.
If more than one union is seeking to represent a group of employees, these
competing unions will have incentives to provide negative information about
each other. But such elections are comparatively rare. In 2004, the NLRB
handled 2,565 elections involving only one union, and 154 elections involving
more than one union.267 Much of this is a result of AFL-CIO guidelines
restricting member unions from competing against each other. Under Article
XX of the AFL-CIO Constitution, member unions are not permitted to organize
or attempt to represent employees that are already represented by another AFL-
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See 29 U.S.C. § 186 (2000) (outlawing payments from employers to unions or union officials).
See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note SW1, at 668 (arguing that information regulation is not
necessary in a competitive market).
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National Labor Relations Board, Sixty-Ninth Annual Report 16 (2005), available at:
http://www.NLRB.gov/NLRB/shared_files/brochures/Annual%20Reports/2004%20WholeAnnua
lReduced.pdf.
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CIO union.268 In addition, member unions cannot disseminate information as
part of an organization campaign that may “adversely affect” the reputation of
another member union.269 These restrictions provide AFL-CIO monopolies
over certain groups of employees.270 Such monopolies are not subject to the
general antirust regulations, as labor unions are specifically exempted from
federal antitrust laws.271
There are good reasons for Article XX and other limitations on union
competition.
Competition between unions wastes union resources.272
Moreover, a union can more effectively utilize collective worker power if the
union represents a large percentage of workers in the industry.273 However,
there are collateral effects to labor union’s antitrust exemption. One of those
effects is that employees cannot comparison-shop between different AFL-CIO
unions as long as those unions comply with Article XX. 274 As a result,
employees do not get the kind of comparative information that a marketplace
with a number of competitors would normally provide.
D. Absence of Reputational Intermediaries
Information problems may sometimes be resolved not by the parties to the
contract themselves, but rather through “reputational intermediaries.” 275
Although critics of mandatory disclosure recognize that firms may have
inadequate incentives to disclose information, they argue that the demand for
information will create a market for that information.276 Although the market,
through interactions between sellers and buyers, is best equipped to determine
268
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Pawlenko, supra note KP1.
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what information is necessary to disclose, 277 sometime sellers will not be in a
position to provide trustworthy or verifiable information to potential buyers.
While acknowledging that information about securities may be more difficult to
verify, critics of mandatory disclosure argue that securities are not unique in
this regard. According to one set of commentators, the “lemons” argument
proves too much, as it is also hard to verify claims about the efficacy of
toothpaste or the pricing of funeral services.278 So without mandatory
disclosure, it is claimed, the securities markets would not dry up; instead,
issuers would use market approaches to create trustworthy information.279
How would this happen? Issuers would voluntarily disclose all of the
information that investors would need in order to buy the stock at a proper
price. If a company refused to disclose, investors would be justifiably wary,
and the prices for their securities would drop precipitously.280 However,
Akerlof’s “market for lemons” thesis assumes that the information about the
product is hard to verify. If there is no system in place for mandatory
disclosure and governmental penalties for failing to do so, then investors may
be concerned about the quality of the information they receive. And Akerlof’s
downward spiral could kick in. Rather than relying on the threat of government
enforcement to assure the quality of information disclosed, issuers would have
to find a private way to assure investors of information quality.281 This is
where reputational intermediaries come in. These market players would sell
their reputations as honest, impartial, and savvy investigators as a means of
checking against issuer fraud. Even with our system of mandatory disclosure,
our securities market still places vital tasks in the hands of reputational
intermediaries. Accounting firms provide independent audits of the firm’s
financial health. Investment banks provide further verification by acting as
underwriters and thus vouching for the security. Attorneys comb through the
issuer’s disclosures to make sure they comply with the relevant law. And
research analysts pore over the disclosures and then report their impressions to
clients, financial media outlets, and/or the investing public.
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There is no denying the importance of reputational intermediaries, or
“gatekeepers,”282 to the proper functioning of the securities markets.
Reputational intermediaries have been blamed for the failures of the 2001-2002
corporate scandals,283 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 endeavors to shore
up the ability of accountants and lawyers to serve as informational
gatekeepers.284 However, much of the current “reputational intermediaries”
system depends on the law to require or reinforce the provision of those
services.285 In his blueprint for a strong securities market, Black notes that such
a market needs not only reputational intermediaries but also laws regulating
these intermediaries. For example, one of Black’s eighteen requirements286 for
controlling informational asymmetry is “[a] sophisticated accounting
profession, with the skill and experience to catch at least some instances of
false or misleading disclosure.”287 However, Black also requires “laws that
impose on accountants enough risk of liability to investors . . . so that the
accountants will resist their clients’ pressure for laxer audits or more favorable
disclosure.”288
282
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Union financial disclosure is governed by the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA).289 The Department of Labor
implements the LMRDA’s requirements through regulations;290 these
regulations were recently modified to require a greater amount of disclosure.291
However, the new regulations have been criticized for not requiring unions to
employ independent or outside auditors.292 By allowing unions to rely on their
own employees to report sensitive financial data, the LMRDA’s regulations do
not require an additional set of independent eyes to verify the veracity of that
data. Although some large unions do use outside auditors in managing their
finances, outside auditors are a general regulatory requirement for publiclytraded companies.293
Of course, LMRDA disclosure is designed for those who have already
joined the union. An employer may use the union’s disclosures for its own
campaign purposes, often using the photocopy of the Department of Labor’s
form to prove its veracity.294 But there is no requirement that employees
receive what the union discloses to the LMRDA during the course of a union
representation campaign. They may not even know of its existence. The
NLRB is an independent agency and distinct from the Department of Labor,
which is an executive branch agency.295 Employees in the midst of a
representation campaign may not know that there is information available that
might be useful to their representation decision until after they are already in
the organization.296

drive accountants to be less strict, leading to less confidence from investors in their results. As
Black notes: “The result is ironic: The principal role of reputational intermediaries is to vouch for
disclosure quality and thereby reduce information asymmetry in securities markets. But
information asymmetry in the market for reputational intermediaries limits their ability to play
this role.” Id. at 788.
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See 29 C.F.R. §§ 403.1–403.11, 408.1–408.13 (2006).
291
See Labor Organization Annual Financial Reports, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,374 (Oct. 9, 2003)
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In addition, there is not the vibrant financial and consumer media that exists
for other products and services. According to Black, another critical institution
for a vibrant securities market is “[a]n active financial press and securities
analysis profession that can uncover and publicize misleading disclosure and
criticize company insiders and (when appropriate) investment bankers,
accountants, and lawyers.”297 As Black noted:
Reputation markets require a mechanism for distributing
information about the performance of companies, insiders, and
reputational intermediaries. Disclosure rules help, as do
reputational intermediaries' incentives to advertise their
successes. But intermediaries won't publicize their own failures,
and investors will discount competitors' complaints because
they come from a biased source. An active financial press is an
important source of reporting of disclosure failures.298
The press does cover union failures and scandals, and such information is
obviously relevant to the union representation decision. However, there is not
the same level of coverage or sophistication that is applied to information about
the securities markets. Nor is there the same sort of attention that is given to
consumer products through such organizations as Consumer Reports.299 There
is no “Consumer Reports for Unions.” For a variety of reasons, it seems
unlikely that reputational intermediaries such as “union analysts” will emerge
any time soon. As AFL-CIO unions do not compete against one another,
employees looking for AFL-CIO representation generally have one choice.
Unlike a publicly-traded security, union representation is not sold on a fungible
national market. Thus, there is not the money to be made on selling
information about unions on a national scale. Additionally, potential union
members would not be in a position to pay significant sums for the kind of
serious analysis that stock investors enjoy. Even if they were, they still might
not choose to do so given the free-rider problems inherent in obtaining the
information. The information would benefit all potential employees at the firm.
In fact, the purchaser would have an incentive to share it, as the purchaser still
needs a majority of employees to agree with her if she wishes to prevail on the
representation question. But while the benefits will accrue to all, it would be
difficult to get all to agree to share in the costs. Given the free-rider concerns,
297
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information that would be efficient for all to obtain might not be efficient for
only one to obtain.
In sum, the role of reputational intermediaries in supplying information to
other markets is not replicated in the union representation market. Their
absence is yet another reason for concern about the information employees
receive.
E. Difficulty of Exit
A corporate shareholder traditionally has two options if unsatisfied with the
direction of the company. The shareholder can either vote for new directors or
sell the shares to someone else. The alienability of shares is a critical part of
bundle of shareholder rights.300 The ability to get out of the investment gives
shareholders an escape hatch in case they become dissatisfied down the road.
In the market for union representation, the consequences of buying into the
union are quite different. The most obvious difference is that the purchase of a
stock gives the buyer something to resell, while a purchaser of services
generally can only stop buying the services. In that sense, exit may be easier
for the purchaser of services, because there is no need to find someone else to
buy it from you. However, service contracts can have lengthy time periods, in
which exit prior to the specified close can be quite expensive.
When a majority of employees vote in favor of a particular union during a
representation election, they are choosing that union to represent them in
collective bargaining. Once selected, the union serves as that representative
indefinitely. In order to stop buying the union’s services, employees must vote
out the union through a decertification election.301 As in the representation
election, a decertification election will only be conducted if the petitioner can
show that at least thirty percent of the employees in the bargaining unit are in
favor of such an election.302 The NLRB then conducts a secret ballot election
and decertifies the union if a majority votes to decertify.
The decertification process is not easy; it takes time to collect signatures for
the petition, hold the actual election, and then resolve any disputes over preelection conduct. However, the statute also provides that no election can be
held within a year after an election has been held.303 In the representation
context, the Board has extended this ban until a year after it has actually
certified the union as bargaining representative.304 The Board will consider any
300
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decertification petition filed within a year of certification to be untimely.305
The contract for union services therefore has at a de jure one-year minimum
term.306
If the union and the employer agree to a contract, the Board imposes an
additional “contract bar” on potential decertification elections. Under the
contract-bar doctrine, employees are prohibited from filing a decertification
petition during the life of a negotiated collective bargaining agreement.307 Once
the union and employer have agreed to terms, the employees must retain the
union for the life of the contract. The contract bar lasts a maximum of three
years, even if the agreement goes beyond that.308 However, the agreement need
not be ratified by members in order to have preclusive effect, unless the
agreement by its terms requires such approval.309
Of course, if the union and employer keep negotiating agreements, making
sure to have a new contract before the other one expires, the employees would
never have an opportunity to decertify the union. Thus, the Board has created a
thirty-day window in which decertification petitions may be filed. The Board
will consider a petition timely if it is filed no more than ninety days, but no less
than sixty days, before the expiration of the agreement.310 The Board created
the sixty-day cutoff in order to give the union a period of negotiation “free from
the threat of overhanging rivalry and uncertainty.”311 Although there are some
exceptions to the contract-bar doctrine, they generally involve an illegal clause
in the contract312 or union incapacity through schism or defunctness.313
The one-year and contract-bar rules are most dangerous when there is
collusion between the employer and the union. Under such circumstances the
employer and the union can agree to a contract and prevent the employees from
voting out the union for up to three years.314 However, even when a union is
merely incompetent, employees would still be stuck with a poor bargaining
representative for a lengthy period of time.
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The Board does allow an alternative to decertification for removing a union
from representation. An employer may refuse to bargain with a union if the
union has in fact lost the support of a majority of the employees.315 This
standard replaced the old rule which permitted employers to cease negotiating
based on a “good faith reasonable doubt” that the union had continuing
majority support.316 Under the new standard, an employer may cease to
negotiate with the union if it can prove that the union no longer enjoys majority
support.317 However, this exit must operate through the employer; it is
therefore unavailable in situations of employer-union collusion. Once again,
we have a situation where the employer has exactly the wrong incentives for its
participation in the process.
There are substantial policy reasons for making it difficult for employees to
decertify a union.318 However, such difficulties also impose a cost. Because of
the difficulties of exit, there is a higher premium placed on employees’ ability
to make the correct decision at the beginning.
F. No Policing of Misrepresentation
As discussed previously,319 the Board has held that misrepresentations do
not violate the Board’s “laboratory conditions” as long as such
misrepresentations are not akin to forgery.320 In summarizing the rationale for
its policy, the Board stated:
In addition to finding [a more restrictive] rule to be unwieldy
and counterproductive, we also consider it to have an unrealistic
view of the ability of voters to assess misleading campaign
propaganda. As is clear from an examination of our treatment of
misrepresentations under the Wagner Act, the Board had long
315
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viewed employees as aware that parties to a campaign are
seeking to achieve certain results and to promote their own
goals. Employees, knowing these interests, could not help but
greet the various claims made during a campaign with natural
skepticism. The ‘protectionism’ propounded by the [the earlier]
rule is simply not warranted. On the contrary, . . . ‘we believe
that Board rules in this area must be based on a view of
employees as mature individuals who are capable of
recognizing campaign propaganda for what it is and discounting
it.’321
A hands-off policy towards the hurly-burly world of political campaigns
might be an appropriate one.322 However, such a stance is anathema in the
world of contracts, where fraud is universally prohibited. Common law fraud
prohibits deception that leads to reliance, and in some circumstances even a
failure to disclose can constitute deception. However, many contractual
regulatory schemes have developed stricter prohibitions against
misrepresentations. In the securities context, for example, federal securities law
has several express and implied causes of actions against misrepresentations.323
Perhaps the most important antifraud provision is Rule 10b-5, which prohibits
misrepresentations or misleading omissions in the context of the purchase or
sale of a security.324 Rule 10b-5 offers substantially more protection against
misrepresentations than traditional common law fraud.325 There has been little
controversy about Rule 10b-5’s basic mission: to eliminate misrepresentations
and misleading omissions in the market for securities.326
321
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Thus, unlike pretty much any other product market, there is no check
against fraud in the market for union representation services, except in the very
narrowest of circumstances. This failure to police against fraud is yet another
reason for concern about the quality of information available to employees.
G. Lack of Public Confidence
The percentage of private employees represented by unions has steadily
declined from the 1950s up until this year.327 These declines come in the face
of polls showing overall public support for unions. For example, recent polls
show that a majority of the public approve of labor unions and believe that
unions are good for the economy.328 However, there is some evidence of
concerns about union competence.329 According to one public poll, seventyone percent agreed that the government ought to do more to protect union
members from corrupt union officials.330 Certainly, images of union corruption
have inundated the public since the 1950s. The 1957-1958 Senate hearings on
union corruption, chaired by Senator John McClellan and staffed by Robert
Kennedy, brought to light many instances of union corruption, including ties
with organized crime.331 Episodes of malfeasance by union officials continue.
Congress, courts, and commentators have struggled with the best methods of
curtail such corruption and have resorted to such extraordinary measures as
forced judicial trusteeships with no set time limits.332 While the federal
government has had significant success in removing organized crime from
certain unions,333 the shadow remains. And in the popular media, shows such
("The social value of preventing fraud in the sale of securities is too clear to require
elaboration.").
327
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as “The Sopranos” portray unions as mere vessels for mafia control of certain
industries.334
In the capital markets, mandatory disclosure has been called upon to shore
up public confidence in securities. The need for public confidence was touted
as a key purpose for the New Deal securities legislation335 and has been cited
repeatedly as justification for further mandatory disclosure.336 The SarbanesOxley Act was perhaps in large part an effort to restore investor confidence
after the shocks of 2001 and 2002.337 Although some commentators have
criticized the lack of empirical support for this justification,338 there is no
question that market confidence encourages investment in equities.339 In fact,
the system of public securities regulation could be considered a government
subsidy to investors and issuers. By taking steps to insure the integrity of the
markets, the government saves investors and issuers enforcement costs that
they would otherwise bear. Our securities market would not be as strong
without this system of public intervention.340
Mandatory disclosure will not prevent fraud; the securities markets amply
demonstrate that. But mandatory disclosure creates a market environment that
is richer in information and less susceptible to breed the most overt kinds of
fraud. Such an environment will help boost public confidence in the market
itself. Just as mandatory disclosure has been employed to improve public
confidence in the securities markets, it may be useful in boosting public
confidence in the market for union representation.

PART IV: PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ON ADDRESSING THE INFORMATION GAP
Given the rampant information difficulties in the market for union
representation, it makes sense to consider ways in which those difficulties may
Trusteeships After Twenty Years: A Progress Report, 19 LAB. LAW. 419 (2004); James B. Jacobs
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be resolved. The traditional answer would be to force the information out into
the market through a system of required disclosure. Systems of mandatory
disclosure, however, are not a panacea: they create costs and may change
market dynamics in inefficient ways. Below is a preliminary discussion of
possible approaches to the information problems in the market for union
representation.
A. Required Disclosure
As noted earlier,341 the Board has focused primarily on the exclusion of
certain kinds of information or speech from the representation campaign; it has
not made efforts to insure the inclusion of relevant information. The only
instance of required disclosure is that employers must provide the union with
the names and addresses of employees in the unit once the election petition has
been filed.342 In explaining why it was requiring this information, the Board
noted:
. . . [W]e regard it as the Board's function to conduct elections . .
. that are free not only from interference, restraint, or coercion
violative of the Act, but also from other elements that prevent or
impede free and reasoned choice. Among the factors that
undoubtedly tend to impede such choice is a lack of information
with respect to one of the choices available.343
Despite the Board’s recognition that a lack of information impedes free and
reasoned choice, it has done little to address the problem.
The most obvious solution to information deficiencies would be a system of
mandatory disclosure. Such a system would directly force out material
information into the marketplace. However, there are significant concerns
about the efficacy of such a system, as well as its costs. Below I address some
of the more prominent issues raised by mandatory disclosure.
1. The exact nature of the information problem. A system of mandatory
disclosure must be designed to address the specific information problems the
disclosure is designed to address. This article has discussed a number of
difficulties in the market for union representation: information asymmetry,
conflicts of interest, lack of competition, lack of reputational intermediaries,
difficulty of exit, lack of fraud protection. Each problem creates a different set
of informational problems. The conflict of interest problem, for example,
relates to a specific set of union-employer relationships in which the union has
341
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been captured, to some degree, by the employer. Smaller, non-AFL-CIO
unions are more likely to fit this profile. The lack of competition, on the other
hand, relates to a problem that is most exacerbated when only AFL-CIO unions
serve a particular community of employees. Any consideration of regulations
would have to disentangle these different problems.
In addition, it is important to keep an eye the collateral effects the
regulation would have. The overall problem is lack of information leading to
(potentially) irrational decisions. But dealing with this problem could have
effects on other issues. For example, greater disclosure requirements could lead
to fewer employees choosing unionization. On the other hand, if union
disclosure were coupled with required employer disclosure, a card-check
certification systems could become more popular.344 Depending on one’s
ultimate policy preferences, the costs and benefits of regulation with regard to
information problems may be outweighed by the costs and benefits such
regulation creates for unionization and industry overall. But the effects of any
system must be considered in its entirety, and the effects of certain policies
(such as disclosure) could be balanced by reforms in other areas (such as cardcheck certification).
2. Existing disclosure regimes. One consideration when contemplating
creating a system of disclosure is the fact that, for certain types of union-related
information, the Board could piggyback on top of the existing regime of
disclosure under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
(LMRDA). LMRDA requires extensive union reporting on union finances,
employee and officer pay, and dues.345 This information is available for public
use and now can be found on the web. But employees in the midst of a
representation campaign are not directed to this information. The Board may
be able to use the already-available pool of disclosed information in shaping
their new disclosure regime. In addition, if policymakers wanted to consider a
disclosure regime for employers, such a regime could draw upon the extensive
system of securities regulation required of public companies.
3. Informational overload and the marginal employee. Information
overload has been a regular concern in the realm of information disclosure.
Commentators regularly note that too much information can be the equivalent
of no information. More damagingly, information overload may drown out
information that would otherwise be accessible.346 In crafting an information
disclosure regime, commentators would need to be sure not make the
information accessible and understandable, or risk conducting a fruitless
exercise.
344
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At the same time, some commentators contend that the problem of
information overload has been exaggerated.347 Given the importance of the
marginal consumer in shaping the market, additional information may be
effective even if only one consumer avails herself of it. In the context of the
representation campaign, the marginal employee makes the difference as to
whether the employees choose the services or not. Thus, the marginal
employee is perhaps even more critical to the market for union representation
than in a traditional consumer market.
One might envision a much more active Board which served as a repository
for information about the campaign and took steps to make sure employees
received that information. For example, the SEC plays such a role with
corporate disclosure: its EDGAR system offers free and simple access to
millions of corporate documents regarding IPOs, annual statements, and proxy
contests.348 The Board could offer two levels of information: one short form
given to all employees, and a database available to all but used only by a small
group. This bifurcation might insure the optimal level of information
dispersion among employees. This is but one option that should be considered
in addressing information problems.349
B. Information and the Neutrality Agreement
This article has focused on the concerns about information deficiencies in
the market for representation services. In considering this market, it is
important to note that private neutrality agreements are an increasingly popular
way for unions to sign up new members. The neutrality agreement is a contract
between a union and an employer in which the employer agrees to remain
neutral while the union endeavors to win the support of a majority of
employees. Such agreements come with a range of procedures. The simplest
of these agreements only requires employer neutrality during the campaign,
with the union then having to succeed in a Board-run election to obtain
representation. However, some neutrality agreements also require the employer
to recognize the union if it obtains signatures on representation cards from a
majority of employees. This process is known as a card-check certification.
347
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Card-check certification essentially allows the parties to opt out of the NLRB’s
representation policies. Unions began negotiating neutrality agreements in the
1970s and their popularity has substantially increased.350
The attraction of neutrality agreements for unions is clear. A recent study
of such agreements found that when they included a card check provision, the
union secured representation of the employees seventy-eight percent of the
time.351 It is less clear why employers would agree to them. In many cases, the
employer has a preexisting relationship with the union as to other employees,
and it can negotiate a neutrality agreement in the context of a larger series of
negotiations.352 The most prominent neutrality agreements include ones in the
auto and telecommunications industries, which have a high union density.353
Unions have also had some success in securing neutrality agreements through
corporate campaigns.354 Some state and local government agencies now require
or encourage employers to sign neutrality agreements in order to be eligible for
governmental contracts.355 In Las Vegas, the Hotel and Restaurant Employees
(HERE) and the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) have
successfully used these tools to obtain neutrality agreements with high profile
employers.356
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Despite their increasing popularity, it is difficult to say how pervasive
neutrality agreements may eventually become. Employers who oppose
unionization will not sign them voluntarily, and to this point unions have only
been able to apply pressure in a limited spectrum of special circumstances. In
addition, Congress has considered legislation to prohibit employer recognition
based on a card-check majority.357 Although it seems unlikely that such a
prohibition would pass, the most recent bill did garner fifty-seven co-sponsors.
Finally, it is unclear whether the NLRB will accord deference to the results of a
card-check certification mandated by a neutrality agreement. In a recent order,
the Board granted review of a case involving the application of the “recognition
bar” doctrine in the context of a neutrality agreement.358 The Board has
traditionally recognized that “voluntary recognition of a union in good faith
based on demonstrated majority status will bar a [decertification or competing
representation] petition for a reasonable period of time.”359 However, the
majority in Dana distinguished the traditional rule by noting that such
precedent “is based upon a union's obtaining signed authorization cards from a
majority of the unit employees before entering into the agreement with an
employer, while in both of the instant cases, an agreement was reached between
the union and the employer before authorization cards, evidencing the majority
status, were obtained.”360 Although it only granted review on the issue and as
yet has made no final determination, the order still generated a strong dissent.361
If the Board ultimately disallows the recognition bar in the card-check
neutrality agreement context, then employers and employees will be free to file
decertification petitions soon after the employer has recognized the union
through the card-check process.362
The strongest argument against neutrality agreement is the potential
impairment of employee free choice.
Anti-union organizations and
commentators have criticized neutrality agreements as opportunities for union
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intimidation and misinformation to carry the day.363 Critics of card-check
neutrality agreements have cited the lack of a “fully informed electorate”364
under such agreements as well as the need for employees to “hear[] views on as
many sides of the issue as possible.”365 The NLRB itself echoed these concerns
when it said that “the fact remains that the secret-ballot election remains the
best method for determining whether employees desire union
representation.”366
Given the concern about informed employee choice, neutrality agreements
may in fact have a greater need for some system of information disclosure than
representation elections. Looking at the parties’ incentives, employers will be
more likely to sign neutrality or card-check agreements when they are less
afraid of the consequences of unionization. And without the pre-election
campaign, there is no official time for employees as a group to consider their
collective decision. Taking steps to insure employees have the appropriate
information may take much of the teeth out of these neutrality-agreement
critiques. Thus, in evaluating information regulation in the context of the
representation election, policymakers should consider the potential for applying
those regulations in the context of neutrality agreements as well. Required
disclosure for card check certifications may alleviate many of the concerns
raised by such procedures while preserving the features that make them
attractive to unions and academic commentators.

CONCLUSION
The Board, courts, and academic commentators have (with good reason)
focused on employer coercion and administrative delay as key concerns in the
regulation of the union representation election. However, the critical role of
information – information necessary to make an efficient representation
decision – has been neglected. This article argues for a new paradigm in
considering the representation election: the purchase of services. In applying
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this paradigm, we must determine whether employees making representation
decisions have the information necessary to make informed and rational
economic decisions. There are many reasons to believe that the market fails to
provide this information, especially in cases where it would be most critical.
Considering these failures, it is worthwhile to explore ways of dealing with this
information gap.

